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"[N]ot a story to pass on"' :
Constructing Mothers Who Kill
Susan Ayres*
We die. That may be the meaning of life. But we do language.
That may be the measure of our lives.
- Toni Morrison2
Two days before Mother's Day, on May 9, 2003 Deanna LaJune Laney
bashed in the brains of her two young sons, and caused serious injuries to
her toddler.3 She called 911 and told the dispatcher that she "had to" kill
her children because "God had told her to.' 4 Her neighbors and friends
were incredulous because they considered Laney "a wonderful mom," and
a "devout Christian woman who home schooled her children and seemed
absorbed in their lives."5
Our impulse on hearing about Laney's murders "is that someone just
can't be in their right mind to have done something like this."'6 And yet
instances of infanticide may be shockingly more common than we expect.
Some studies find that "nearly one infant is killed every day" in the United
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1. TONI MORRISON, BELOVED 274-75 (1987).
2. Toni Morrison, Nobel Lecture 1993 in TONI MORRISON: CRITICAL AND THEORETICAL
APPROACHES 271 (Nancy Peterson ed., 1997).
3. Anne Belli Gesalman, Andrea Yates Redux, NEWSWEEK WEB EXCLUSIVE, May 17,
2003, available at 2003 WL 11863494.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast, May 12, 2003), available at
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States; however, due to problematic reporting and ascertainment of the
cause of death, the number of infanticides may be "double that number."7
Nevertheless, we label a mother who kills her children - especially a
mother like Laney, who seems to be a terrific mom - as "other," as
different and as crazy. We fail to view her actions with "other love," to
listen to her as a speaking subject.
Incidents of infanticide such as the Laney story fill us with horror -
they are stories not to be passed on, to paraphrase Toni Morrison.8 And yet
they are stories that insidiously lodge themselves in our collective
consciousness.9  Our responses to infanticide and our attempts to
understand infanticide are intertwined with our perceptions of motherhood.
This article examines how social institutions have constructed motherhood
and how that construction impedes our reaction to infanticides.
Toni Morrison has said in her Nobel acceptance speech, "We die. That
may be the meaning of life. But we do language. That may be the measure
of our lives."10  How we "do language" in judicial decisions about
infanticide can perhaps be compared to and informed by fiction such as
Toni Morrison's Beloved."
Beloved provides a fictional account of the life of a historical woman, a
slave who escaped to freedom and then attempted to kill all four of her
children, successfully killing one when her master came to claim her under
the Fugitive Slave Act. 12 In addition to telling a story about infanticide,
which not only the typical reader but also characters in the novel find
impossible to understand, Beloved is a story about the spectrum of love -
from hate to smothering affection. The novel suggests that understanding
infanticide depends upon a notion of outlaw justice that is grounded in a
mother's private ethics. 13 The mother's action becomes comprehensible, if
7. Mary Overpeck, Epidemiology of Infanticide, in INFANTICIDE: PSYCHOSOCIAL AND
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON WOMEN WHO KILL 19, 19 (Margaret G. Spinelli ed., 2003).
8. See MORRISON, supra note 1.
9. For instance, in response to a Houston infanticide, Dr. J. Ray Hays, a psychiatry
professor, commented: "It's probably in our mind the worst thing that could happen, the
worst tragedy." T.J. Milling, Science Seeks Roots of Infanticide, Rare Psychosis May Play a
Role in Some Slayings, HouS. CHRON., Oct. 15, 1995, at 37A, available at 1995 WL
9409134. The article further states, "These maternal attacks on the very young seem to run
counter to the very foundations of human nature and one of its most sacred relationships."
Id.
10. Morrison, supra note 2.
11. Another contemporary novel which explores infanticide and postpartum depression is
Renate Dorrestein's HEART OF STONE (Hester Velmans trans., Penguin Books 1998). See
also, Lori Saint-Martin, Infanticide, Suicide, Matricide, and Mother-Daughter Love:
Suzanne Jacob's L 'ob~issance and Ying Chen 's L 'ingratitude, 169 Canadian Literature 60
(2001) (analyzing two Qudbec novels involving infanticide).
12. MORRISON, supra note 1, passim.
13. See MARIA ARISTODEMOU, LAW AND LITERATURE: JOURNEYS FROM HER TO ETERNITY
225 (2000) (arguing that "[t]he discourse of motherhood may crucially provide the
beginnings of a new ethics, an ethics that, by starting from a mother's love for the strangest
and most intimate of others, undermines the notion of the individual as separate, self-
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at all, only through "love for the other," through Morrison's use of legal
narrative which helps readers to begin to understand the other.14 We view
the infanticidal mother as "other" as a result of our binary, hierarchized
thinking. "Love for the other" can take place when we refuse to label the
infanticidal mother as "other," when we privilege the "other," and begin to
hear pieces of her story from her view, when we allow her to be a speaking
subject. 5 Before examining the novel, Part I of this article compares the
plot of Beloved with Modern Medea, the nonfiction account of the slave
mother who committed infanticide and who served as the inspiration for
Morrison's main character. 16 Part II explores ways in which law constructs
definitions of motherhood, especially of mothers who kill their children -
by specularizing women, by silencing women, and by labeling mothers
who kill their children as either "bad or mad." Part III then examines the
historical and fictional reaction to infanticide in both Beloved and Modern
Medea in order to show how discourse constructs motherhood and how
difficult it is to respond to infanticide with love for the other. Both the
historical and fictional communities ostracized the slave mother as "other"
and refused to understand the circumstances or motivation for the murder.
Part III weaves together the narrative threads Morrison uses to help the
reader overcome the community's bias and to understand the mother's
murder. Although the reader may not condone the mother's action, the
reader of Beloved may be able to see her not as "other," but with "other
love" as a speaking subject, and thus perceive the circumstances that led to
the infanticide.
Part V of this article is a selected sampling of Texas judicial decisions
and news reports of cases of infanticide by Texas mothers from 1899 to the
present, and Part V analyzes trial and media responses to the infanticides
by Andrea Yates, a Houston mother who drowned her five children. Both
Parts IV and V examine how juridico-legal discourse constructs mothers
who kill their children. Finally, this article concludes by arguing that legal
interested, and uniquely self-sufficient.").
14. This article is especially indebted to the earlier analysis of Beloved by Marie Ashe,
who demonstrates how a "careful reading of Beloved can assist those ... engaged in the
legal representation of 'bad mothers' to new understandings of our clients and of our own
work," Marie Ashe, The "Bad Mother" in Law and Literature: A Problem of
Representation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1017, 1018 (1992); and by Elizabeth Tobin, who reads
Beloved against several legal decisions and argues that "the truth of legal disputes involving
mothers is not likely to be recognized in the legal system until attorneys and judges explore
the ambiguities of the maternal experience as expressed from the mother's perspective."
Elizabeth Tobin, Imagining the Mother's Text: Toni Morrison 's Beloved and Contemporary
Law, 16 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 233, 237 (1993).
15. HtLtNE CIXOUS, Sorties: Out and Out: Attacks/Ways Out/Forays, in THE NEWLY
BORN WOMAN 71 (Besty Wing trans. 1993). See infra for discussion of "other love" that
describes a relationship not based on hierarchical views of one as different and "other."
16. STEVEN WEISENBURGER, MODERN MEDEA: A FAMILY STORY OF SLAVERY AND CHILD-
MURDER FROM THE OLD SOUTH (1998).
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narratives of infanticide could benefit by striving to fully hear and record
the accused mother's tale not as "other," but with "other love," to
understand the complexity of a mother's experience.
I. "ONCE UPON A TIME": MARGARET GARNER CREATED
AS SETHE
Toni Morrison wrote Beloved after she read an 1856 newspaper
account published in the National Anti-slavery Standard, "A Visit to the
Slave Mother Who Killed Her Child," which gives the bare details about
Margaret Garner's escape from slavery and murder of her 2-year-old
daughter when "slave-hunters" arrived to reclaim her. 17  Morrison has
stated in an interview that she "did not do much research on Margaret
Garner other than the obvious stuff, because I wanted to invent her life."' 8
In telling the story, Morrison wanted to show "the way in which women are
so vulnerable to displacing themselves, into something other than
themselves." 19 Therefore, before summarizing Beloved, it is important to
review the Garner story, to see the differences between fact and invention,
and consequently, to understand what Morrison means when she says "my
story, my invention, is much, much happier than what really happened. '1
A. MODERN MEDEA
Steven Weisenburger's book Modern Medea: A Family Story of
Slavery and Child-Murder from the Old South recounts the Garner story in
detail. Although earlier published accounts exist,21 Modern Medea
provides many more details in a "fascinating" and "brilliant ' 22 story of
Margaret Garner, a slave at Maplewood Plantation in Kentucky. In 1849,
when Margaret (then 16 years old) married Robert Garner (then 15 years
old and a slave from a nearby plantation owned by James Marshall), they
17. Marilyn Sanders Mobley, A Different Remembering: Memory, History and Meaning
in Toni Morrison's Beloved, in TONI MORRISON 189, 190 (Harold Bloom ed., 1990); article
reproduced in Angelita Reyes, Using History as Artifact to Situate Beloved's Unknown
Woman: Margaret Garner in APPROACHES TO TEACHING THE NOVELS OF TONI MORRISON
77, 84 (Nellie Y. McKay and Kathryn Earle, eds., 1997).
18. Marsha Darling, In the Realm of Responsibility: A Conversation with Toni Morrison,
in CONVERSATIONS WITH TONI MORRISON 246, 248 (Danielle Taylor-Guthrie ed., 1994).
19. Gail Caldwell, Author Toni Morrison Discusses Her Latest Novel Beloved, in
CONVERSATIONS WITH TONI MORRISON, 239, 241 (Danielle Taylor-Guthrie ed., 1994).
20. Darling, supra note 18, at 251.
21. See, e.g., LEVI COFFIN, REMINISCENCES OF LEVI COFFIN, THE REPUTED PRESIDENT OF
THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD, 557 (2d ed. 1880).
22. WEISENBURGER, supra note 16, at jacket cover; see also Marilyn Mobley McKenzie,
Remembering Rebellion, THE WOMEN'S REV. OF BOOKS, May 1999, at 6 (book review)
(noting that the work takes the reader "deep into the historical, legal and political recesses of
story"); John M. Coski, Historian Expands Tale of Recaptured Slaves, RICH. TIMES
DISPATCH, Jan. 10, 1999, at F4 (book review) (Weisenburger's book "remind[s] us that
history can be as dramatic and provocative as fiction.").
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were expecting their first child.23 That same year, when the owner of
Maplewood, John Pollard Gaines, became governor of Oregon, he sold the
plantation and eleven slaves including Margaret, to his brother, Archibald
Gaines - a melancholy and mean-spirited man, who often threatened to
sell the slaves.24
In 1856 Margaret Garner escaped to Ohio along with her four children
(also slaves of Archibald Gaines), her husband Robert Garner, and his
parents, Simon and Mary (also slaves of James Marshall).25 In the escape,
Robert drove a sleigh eighteen miles to Covington, where the family
walked across the frozen Ohio River to the Cincinnati house of Margaret's
26
cousin Elijah Kite, who had contacted the Underground Railroad. The
Garners arrived at Kite's house at about five in the morning; Kite met with
Levi Coffin, an Underground Railroad organizer, who told him to remove
the family immediately, but by the time Kite returned, United States
27
marshals already had the house under surveillance.
The Garners were trailed by Archibald Gaines and James Marshall's
son Thomas, who had discovered the escape several hours after the Garners
had left and who arrived at the U.S. marshals' offices at about six or seven
in the morning.28 After the commissioner issued a warrant, the deputy and
officers attempted to arrest the Garners. 29  During the arrest, Robert
repeatedly fired a gun he had taken with him, and when the officers
entered, they discovered that the throat of 2-and-a-half-year-old Mary had
been cut, that the two older boys, Tom and Sam, had also been cut, and
were hiding under the bed, and that the mother was hitting 9-month-old
30Cilla with a shovel. Mary was the only child Margaret had killed, and a
witness watched as Archibald "appear[ed] on the front porch of the house
carrying little Mary's body and sobbing uncontrollably over her corpse." 31
Archibald had to be restrained from taking Mary home on horseback.32
Archibald's unusual reaction to Mary's death can perhaps be explained
by his probable paternity. According to the 1850 census, Margaret's first
child, Thomas, was black, so Weisenburger concludes that Robert was
probably the baby's father.33 Margaret was described by Levi Coffin as "a
mulatto, about five feet high, showing one-fourth or one-third white
23. WEISENBURGER, supra note 16, at 34.
24. Id. at 34, 42, 44.
25. Id. at 5; see also COFFIN, supra note 21, at 557-58.
26. Id. at 5, 55; see also COFFIN, supra note 21, at 558.
27. Id. at 62-64; see also COFFIN, supra note 21, at 559.
28. WEISENBURGER, supra note 16, at 64.
29. Id. at 64-67.
30. Id. at 72-73.
31. Id. at 75.
32. Id. at 75-76.
33. Id. at 44-47. Weisenberger points out that Archibald's behavior, "the extremity of his
grieving, and especially his clinging to the corpse, suggested then and now a still dearer
relation to the little girl" beyond that of master. Id. at 75-76.
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blood., 34 Census reports and newspaper accounts do not list Margaret's
three subsequent children as black - the 1852 census describes Samuel as
mulatto; the 1856 newspaper accounts describe Mary as "almost white"
and Cilla as "bright mulatto" (i.e., light).35 In 1856 when the Garners
escaped, Margaret was again several months pregnant.
36
While there is no evidence whether the "nature of their [Margaret and
Archibald's] relationship" was rape or consensual sex, Margaret's actions
suggest negative inferences about her circumstances after John Pollard
Gaines sold the plantation.37 Additionally, when she did finally escape, she
ended up killing the child with the lightest skin color. Coffin describes the
child as "almost white, a little girl of rare beauty., 38  Although the
coroner's inquest failed to determine which adult had killed Mary, later
Margaret confessed, saying "that her determination was to have killed all
the children and then destroy herself rather than return to slavery," and
complaining "of cruel treatment on the part of their master," who was "the
cause of their attempt to escape. 39
Margaret was tried under the Fugitive Slave Law in federal court, and
was indicted, but never tried, by the Ohio state court for murder.4 ° John
Jolliffe, her abolitionist lawyer, who had argued almost every Ohio slave
case, asserted the First Amendment defense that Christians didn't have to
obey the Fugitive Slave Law.4 1 He also argued that because Margaret had
42
visited Ohio (free soil) as a child, she was automatically free. Moreover,
Jolliffe used the murder charge against Margaret as a strategy to slow down
the federal case - thus, he obtained a writ of habeas corpus from a
Cincinnati probate judge to release the Garners from federal custody so that
Margaret could be charged for murder.43 Jolliffe stated that "the fugitives
34. COFFIN, supra note 21, at 562.
35. WEISENBURGER, supra note 16, at 44. Weisenburger concludes that it is likely
Archibald was the father of Samuel, Mary, and Cilla. Robert was probably not the father
because he "had been on lengthy and distant hiring-out until just a month before the Garners
fled," and because Archibald was also "the only adult white male on Maplewood throughout
these years." Id. at 44-48. Moreover, the birth of each of Elizabeth Gaines' children was
several months before Margaret's. Id. at 47. Thus, when Elizabeth was pregnant,
Archibald's sexual outlet could very well have been Margaret. Id. at 47-48. Indeed, after
the abolitionist, Lucy Stone, interviewed Margaret in jail, Stone made a speech insinuating
that Archibald was the father of the children. She boldly told a packed courtroom that "[t]he
faded faces of the negro children tell too plainly to what degradation the female slaves
submit. Rather than give her little daughter to that life, she killed it." Id. at 48, 173.
36. Id. at 48. The 1860 census listing of a female mulatto is probably Margaret's fifth
child.
37. Id. Under Archibald, Margaret "had withstood six years of greater uncertainty and
harsher treatment than she had formerly known." Id.
38. COFFIN, supra note 21, at 563.
39. WEISENBURGER, supra note 16, at 76, 89.
40. Id. at 111-12, 150.
41. Id. at 100-01.
42. Id. at 103.
43. Id. at 80.
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have all assured me that they will go singing to the gallows rather than be
returned to slavery.
4 4
Typically, fugitive slave trials were summary proceedings that lasted
only several days, but Margaret's lasted two weeks.45  When the
commissioner handed down his decision after four weeks of deliberation,
the Garners were in custody in the county jail, and the sheriff initially
refused to turn them over.4 6 The commissioner's decision concluded that
the prior temporary visits to Ohio did not free Margaret - the same result
that the Supreme Court reached a year later in Dred Scott, which had been
argued before the Supreme Court during Margaret's trial - and that the
fugitive slave laws were a question of property. 7
After the commissioner's Fugitive Slave decision, a United States
district judge denied the state's authority to try Margaret for murder on the
basis that "a state process for murder [did not take] ... precedence over a
federal fugitive slave warrant. ' 48 Then, while the Garners were on a
steamboat to Gaines's brother's plantation in Arkansas, judges in two
courts issued significant orders.49  First, a judge of the Ohio Court of
Common Pleas ruled that the federal marshals should have turned over the
prisoners to county officials; second, an Ohio probate court judge ruled that
the fugitive slave laws were unconstitutional and held the federal marshal
in contempt.50 Unfortunately, however, while en route to Arkansas, the
steamboat crashed and Margaret jumped overboard with the ten-month-old
baby, Priscilla, who drowned. 1
After this latest tragedy, Archibald Gaines brought Margaret back at
the request of the Kentucky governor, and Gaines put her in jail in
Kentucky for about a week before he took her back to Maplewood
Plantation, put her in another jail, and finally on another steamboat back
south - all an elaborate "shell game" to hide her from the Ohio officials
44. COFFIN, supra note 21, at 561.
45. The defendant could not testify; rather, the witnesses merely identified the fugitives
and claimed bondage. WEISENBURGER, supra note 16, at 111-12. Margaret's trial was an
exception in several respects. The commissioner excluded blacks from the courtroom, and
because of threats of a race riot or abolitionist rescue, ordered four weeks of deputy
protection at the cost of $800 a day. Id. at 110, 116, 153. Moreover, the trial was unusual in
that Margaret was allowed to testify that she had been in Cincinnati before - this was
possibly the only time a slave had been allowed to testify in a fugitive slave case. Id. at
163-64.
46. Id. at 182. Eventually, the sheriff released the prisoners because he had only several
dozen county officers to back him up, as opposed to the federal government, which had 800
men waiting to enforce the decision. Id. at 195.
47. Id. at 189-90, 162. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
48. WEISENBURGER, supra note 16, at 194.
49. Id. at 209, 230.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 223-25. The cook who saved Margaret claimed she was happy that her baby
had drowned. Id. at 225.
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who were trying to retrieve her. Eventually she was sold from the
Gaines's Arkansas plantation to a 600-acre cotton farm plantation in
Mississippi and died of typhoid in 1858.
53
Margaret's travails inspired two nineteenth century novels (both ghost
stories): Liberty or Death! by Hattia M'Keehan, and Chattanooga by
Jolliffe, her abolitionist lawyer.54  Interestingly, however, after
Reconstruction Margaret Garner disappeared from history and memory for
a hundred years until Beloved was published in 1987. 55
B. BELOVED
Morrison purposefully did not research the details of Margaret
Garner's story because, as noted above, she wanted to "invent" Margaret's
story.56 The novel begins in Cincinnati in 1873 at the house of Sethe and
her daughter Denver, the daughter bom during Sethe's escape from Sweet
Home.57 Unlike Margaret, who escaped with her husband and in-laws,
Sethe escaped alone, having sent her children ahead of her.58 Sethe's
husband Halle, one of the Sweet Home men and the father of all her
children, planned to escape with her, but didn't because he went insane
after he saw Sethe assaulted.59
Morrison's postmodem novel about Sethe is a circular telling of the
"rememories" of Sethe and Paul D, another former slave from Sweet Home
who shows up on her doorstep in Cincinnati.60 While they carry traumatic
memories of their lives as slaves, their memories are juxtaposed with the
"shameless beauty" of Sweet Home.61 The original owner, Mr. Garner, ran
Sweet Home as an enlightened despot, who "disallowed" beatings and
bragged that his male slaves were "men," unlike the other owners' males
slaves, who were just "boys. 62  However, after Mr. Garner died, Mrs.
Garner developed a huge "lump in her neck the size of a sweet potato," and
sold the farm to her brother-in-law. 6' Like Margaret Gamer's plantation,
the ownership of Sweet Home changed from the "high principles" of the
original owner to the brutal principles of his brother, known as
52. Id. at 232-43.
53. Id. at 244-45, 277-78.
54. Id. at 92, 271. Chattanooga was published in 1858, and Liberty or Death in 1856.
Liberty or Death made Margaret very fair, and "[tihis revision ... becomes crucial because
[the novel] plays out themes of rape and miscegenation that few, excepting Lucy Stone, had
been willing to name;" the racy novel was printed at least seven times. Id. at 271-72. See
infra at Part I1I.A. (for more information about Lucy Stone's speech).
55. WEISENBURGER, supra note 16, at 8-10.
56. See supra note 18.
57. MORRISON, supra note 1, at 3.
58. Id. at 8, 76-85. 90-94.
59. Id. at 16-17, 23, 68-70.
60. Id. at 36.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 10, 197.
63. Id. at 9.
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Schoolteacher. 64 The following sections discuss the three parts of the
difficult-to-summarize novel and address the question: Who is Beloved?
1. "124 was spiteful. 65
Morrison's writing is poetic and multivocal. Part One, which
comprises almost half of the novel, begins with the arrival of Paul D, and
includes the arrival of a young girl who calls herself "Beloved. 6 6 The
novel opens with the cryptic sentence "124 was spiteful," 67 shorthand for
Sethe's house (124 Bluestone Road) being haunted by a spiteful baby
ghost, Beloved. Part One also tells the story of Sethe's assault by
Schoolteacher's nephews who stole her milk, a traumatic event that leaves
her emotionally as well as physically scarred. 68 As Sethe tells Paul D:
"After I left you, those boys came in there and took my milk.
That's what they came in there for. Held me down and took it. I
told Mrs. Garner on em. She had that lump and couldn't speak but
her eyes rolled out tears. Them boys found out I told on em.
Schoolteacher made one open up my back, and when it closed it
made a tree. It grows there still."
"They used cowhide on you?"
"And they took my milk."
"They beat you and you was pregnant?"
"And they took my milk!,
69
The tree on her back is a web of scars that Amy, a runaway white girl
who delivers Denver on the banks of the Ohio River, describes as a
"chokecherry tree .... What God have in mind, I wonder., 70 When Sethe
and Paul D stand in the kitchen he sees the tree as "the decorative work of
an ironsmith too passionate for display. ' 71 But after Paul D and Sethe have
sex, and feel "resentful of one another" and "sorry and too shy," Paul D
64. Id. at 10, 36-37.
65. One of my favorite assignments in teaching BELOVED is to have students look at the
poetic first sentence of many of the chapters, such as "124 was spiteful" Id. at 3; "A fully
dressed woman walked out of the water" Id. at 50; "Rainwater held on to pine needles for
dear life and Beloved could not take her eyes off Sethe" Id. at 57; "She moved him" Id. at
114; "124 was loud" Id. at 169; "His coming is the reverse
route of his going" Id. at 263; "There is a loneliness that can be rocked" Id. at 274.
66. Id. at 50-53. The next section of this article discusses the character, Beloved.
67. Id. at 3. Each part of the novel begins with a sentence "124 was." See infra.
68. Id. at 16-17.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 79.
71. Id. at 17.
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thinks of the tree as a "wrought-iron maze," "[n]ot a tree .... Maybe
shaped like one, but nothing like any tree he knew because trees were
inviting; things you could trust and be near.,
72
Part One also tells about the traumatic events in Paul D's life that have
caused him to put his heart in a "tobacco tin" in his chest, including the
time Schoolteacher forced a bit in his mouth for trying to escape.73 Then,
after Paul D was sold and tried to kill the new master, he was sent to a
74chain gang in Georgia, where guards raped and sodomized the prisoners.
As a result of his traumas, Paul D's heart is imprisoned in his symbolic
tobacco tin until Beloved seduces him and breaks the rusted seams of the
tin.75
Part One describes Sethe's escape, the birth of Denver, and the twenty-
eight days of freedom, before the murder, when Sethe could love her
children and wake up and decide what to do with her life.76 Unlike
Margaret, who was captured the morning of her escape, Sethe and her four
children live with her mother-in-law, Baby Suggs "holy," a self-taught
preacher, for a month before the slave catchers arrive. In celebration of
Sethe's arrival, Baby Suggs has a community feast for ninety people, but
the celebration reaches such extravagance that the community disapproves
and then neglects to warn the family of the arrival of the slave catchers
described apocalyptically as four horsemen.77
When Sethe saw the slave catchers coming, she killed the crawling
baby (as yet unnamed in the novel), but was then restrained from killing
Denver or the boys. 8 Narrated from the viewpoint of Schoolteacher, the
scene is described as follows:
Inside, two boys bled in the sawdust and dirt at the feet of a nigger
woman holding a blood-soaked child [Beloved] to her chest with
one hand and an infant [Denver] by the heels in the other. She did
not look at them; she simply swung the baby toward the wall
planks, missed and tried to connect a second time, when out of
nowhere - in the ticking time the men spent staring at what there
was to stare at - the old nigger boy [Stamp Paid], still mewing,
ran through the door behind them and snatched the baby from the
72. Id. at 20-21.
73. Id. at 68-73.
74. Id. at 71-72, 106-08; See Pamela E. Barnett, Figurations of Rape and the
Supernatural in Beloved, 112 PMLA 418, 419 (May 1997) (arguing that the repressed
trauma of rape haunts the characters and manifests itself in Beloved's appearance, and
listing the many other incidents of rape in the novel).
75. MORRISON, supra note 1, at 117; see also infra, Part I.C.
76. MORRISON, supra note 1, at 95.
77. Id. at 135-38, 148.
78. Id. at 148-49.
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arch of its mother's swing.79
Schoolteacher's callous response to the infanticide is to leave empty-
handed, because "there was nothing to claim., 80  Schoolteacher blamed
"the nephew who'd overbeat her and made her cut and run. Schoolteacher
had chastised that nephew, telling him to think -just think - what would
his own horse do if you beat it beyond the point of education.""
Whereas Margaret was never tried for the murder, Sethe apparently
served a jail term for the murder of the baby.82 At the end of Part One,
Paul D learns that Sethe murdered her child and he leaves her.83
2. "124 was loud.
84
Part Two of Beloved develops the interaction between Sethe, Denver,
and Beloved, who have isolated themselves from the community. This part
begins with the sentence "124 was loud,' 85 which is an allusion to the
energy brewing between Sethe and Beloved. Sethe joyfully realizes that
Beloved is her child returned from the dead,86 and much of this part adds
more rememories of Sethe's life at Sweet Home, such as the traumatic
memory of Schoolteacher's graphing of her human and animal
characteristics.87 Part Two also contains musings of Sethe's justification
for killing the baby - to put her in a safe place.88  She incorrectly thinks
Beloved will understand her action.89
Likewise, in this part, a man named Stamp Paid explains to Paul D that
he received his name when he handed his wife over for his master's son's
sexual gratification, and then renamed himself Stamp Paid for his
obligations paid.90 Stamp Paid now tries to correct the mistake he realizes
he made in telling Paul D about the murder.91 Thus, he makes several trips
to Sethe's house, but never sees her because he cannot bring himself to
knock on Sethe's door since he has always just entered without knocking.
79. Id. at 149.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 42, 104, 183.
83. Id. at 165.
84. Id. at 169.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 175-76.
87. Id. at 193. Sethe overhears Schoolteacher ordering his pupils, "No, no. That's not
the way. I told you to put her human characteristics on the left; her animal ones on the right.
And don't forget to line them up." Id. Schoolteacher was likely a believer in the theory of
polygenesis, that blacks and whites were completely different species, and was
characterizing the features of Sethe in order to demonstrate differences to his students.
WEISENBURGER, supra note 16, at 265-66.
88. Id. at 200.
89. Id. at 183-84.
90. Id. at 232-33.
91. Id. at 170.
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Now he cannot enter without knocking, either.92 Each time he goes to the
house, he hears a loud roaring, symbolic of Beloved's brewing anger
threatening to erupt against Sethe.93 So, Stamp Paid never helps Sethe
directly, but he does manage to apologize to Paul D and to bring him back
into the community.94 As a result, the community learns from Paul D about
the strange arrival of Beloved - from nowhere - and that "she scares
[Paul D] the most."95
3. "124 was quiet.
' 96
Part Three, the shortest part of the novel, focuses on the struggle
between Sethe, who is physically and emotionally shrinking, and Beloved,
who is growing. This part opens with the sentence "124 was quiet., 97 The
house's energy has become overwhelmed by Beloved's ravenous hunger
and irrepresible anger. Sethe tries to make Beloved understand why she
had to kill her. She fears that Beloved will leave before she can make her
realize that whites could "dirty you" and that Sethe chose not to let whites
dirty her children.98 Indeed, Sethe's "plan was to take us all to the other
side where my own ma'am is." 99 However, Beloved refuses to accept
Sethe's justification, and begins to control the house with her anger and her
demands for sweets.100 Beloved and Sethe exclude Denver, who finally
realizes that if she doesn't get help, her mother will die.101
Denver goes out into the community and finds a job working the night
shift for the Bodwins, the abolitionist sister and brother who had donated
the house to Baby Suggs and who defended Sethe in her murder trial.
102
Through Denver, the black community learns that Beloved has come back
in the flesh to "whip[ ] Sethe." Ella, one of the most outspoken women,
convinces the other women to rescue Sethe because "[w]hatever Sethe had
done, Ella didn't like the idea of past errors taking possession of the
present."
' 10 3
The rescue parallels the scene in Part One when the slave catchers first
come for Sethe. This time, Bodwin approaches on horseback to take
Denver to work; however, Denver is busy looking in the opposite direction
92. Id. at 172-73.
93. Id. at 169, 172.
94. Id. at 230-35.
95. Id. at 234.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 239.
98. Id. at 241-42, 251.
99. Id. at 203; see also, Id. at 241 (Sethe indicates "her plan was always that they would
all be together on the other side, forever. Beloved wasn't interested.").
100. Id. at 242-43.
101. Id. at243.
102. Id. at 253-55.
103. Id. at 255-57.
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at the thirty women coming down the road and doesn't see Bodwin.' °4
Sethe and Beloved hear the women's singing, which to Sethe sounds like
"where the voices of women searched for the right combination, the key,
the code, the sound that broke the back of words .... It broke over Sethe
and she trembled like the baptized in its wash."' 5  When Sethe sees
Bodwin, however, she believes he is the slave catcher who has returned,
and tries to kill him. 0 6 As the women stop Sethe, Beloved, who is naked
and hugely pregnant,'0 7 disappears into thin air.
10 8
After this, Paul D returns to care for Sethe. She has taken to bed, like
Baby Suggs after "the Misery" (the murder),'0 9 in order to "ponder[ ]
color."" 0 Sethe tells Paul D she is sad because her "best thing" left; Paul D
tells her, "You your best thing, Sethe. You are."' 1 Sethe's last words are
"Me? Me?""' 2 so, like many postmodern novels, the story doesn't end with
closure, but is open-ended. This ending question, however, is significant in
the construction of identity and motherhood. As Morrison has commented
in an interview, "[Sethe] can consider the possibility of an individual pride,
of a real self which says 'you're your best thing.' Just to begin to think of
herself as a proper name - she's always thought of herself as a mother, as
her role."' 13
The final two-page epilogue of the novel lyrically comments on the
story in the voice of the omniscient narrator. "It was not a story to pass on"
is repeated as a refrain." 4 The ending announces: "They forgot her like a
bad dream"; and, "In the place where long grass opens, the girl who waited
to be loved and cry shame erupts into her separate parts, to make it easy for
the chewing laughter to swallow her all away."' '15 While Beloved literally
disappeared before their eyes, the memories of her will likewise disappear.
Despite "their" forgetting, Morrison wants us to remember and ponder the
story. As she has said, "the whole point is to have those characters...
104. Id. at 257.
105. Id. at 261.
106. Id. at 261-62. Morrison's description of this scene is so elusive as to be almost
incomprehensible.
107. Although her pregnancy might be viewed symbolically, Morrison has stated that
Beloved is really pregnant, and the pregnancy is the result of her seduction of Paul D.
Darling, supra note 18, at 249. Morrison admits that "Nobody likes that part. I know that a
couple of people to whom I have said what I just said to you, said 'I don't want to know
that,' so I thought, 'okay.' But there is a moment somewhere in time in which that's what
you have to know. That is, ghosts or spirits are real and I don't mean [just a thought]." Id.
108. MORRISON, supra note 1, at 261-62.
109. Id. at 177.
110. Id at 271-72. Baby Suggs goes to bed because "she knew death was anything but
forgetfulness, [so] she used the little energy left her for pondering color." Id. at 4.
111. Id. at 272-73.
112. Id.
113. Darling, supra note 18, at 251.
114. Id.at274-75.
115. Id. at 274.
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move off the page and inhabit the imagination of whoever has opened
herself or himself to them. I don't want to write books that you can
close.., and walk on off and read another one right away."" 6  The
reader's responsibility is to "shape it and figure it out. It's not over just
because it stops. It lingers and it's passed on."' 1 7 The novel ends with the
single-word paragraph: "Beloved."
'
"
18
C. WHO IS BELOVED?
What do we make of the character Beloved? Interestingly, like the two
nineteenth century novels based on Margaret Garner's story, Beloved is
also a ghost story." 9 Morrison explains that she chose a ghost because "I
got to a point where in asking myself who could judge Sethe adequately,
since I couldn't, and nobody else that knew her could, really, I felt the only
person who could judge her would be the daughter she killed. And from
there Beloved inserted herself into the text."' 2 °
Morrison's style has been compared to the magical realism of South
American writer Gabriel Garcia Marquez.' 21 Indeed, not far into a novel
such as Beloved does the reader accept the inevitability of surreal events,
such as the "pool of red and undulating light"'122 through which Paul D
steps, and other signs of a ghostly presence. The inevitability of a ghost is
confirmed by Baby Suggs, who didn't want to move merely because the
house was haunted, since "Not a house in the country ain't packed to its
rafters with some dead Negro's grief."'123  This statement reflects
Morrison's belief that ghosts are everywhere, as she said in an interview:
"As a child, everybody knew there were ghosts... You didn't put your
hand under the bed when you slept at night. It's that place that you go to
[in Beloved], right away ... a shared human response to the world.', 124
Assuming the belief in ghosts is shared, not everyone reacts the same
way. For instance, Paul D fights the baby ghost the first evening he arrives
when the room begins shaking and "pitching":
"God damn it! Hush up!" Paul D was shouting, falling, reaching
for anchor. "Leave the place alone! Get the hell out!" A table
rushed toward him and he grabbed its leg. Somehow he managed
to stand at an angle and, holding the table by two legs, he bashed it
about, wrecking everything, screaming back at the screaming
116. Darling, supra note 18, at 253.
117. Id.
118. Id at 275.
119. MORRISON, supra note 1, at 274.
120. Darling, supra note 18, at 248.
121. Denise Heinze, Toni Morrison in 143 DICTIONARY OF LITERARY BIOGRAPHY,
AMERICAN NOVELISTS SINCE WORLD WAR 11, THIRD SERIES 171-187 (Gale Group 1994).
122. MORRISON, supra note 1, at 8.
123. Id. at 5, 8-9.
124. Caldwell, supra note 19, at 242.
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house. "You want to fight, come on! God damn it! She got
enough without you. She got enough!
125
Afterwards, when the house is quiet, Denver "miserably" realizes that
the baby ghost "was gone.' 26 A short time later, she sees a ghostly image
of a young woman "holding its arm around her mother's waist," and tells
her mother about it, saying, "Well, I think the baby got plans.' 27  Not
surprisingly, when Beloved appears, Denver is the first to realize that she is
the embodiment of the baby ghost. Her understanding is implicit when she
tells Sethe that Here Boy, the dog who had been attacked by the baby
ghost, "won't be back" now that Beloved has come.
128
Although there are many indications that the grown woman who shows
up and calls herself Beloved is the baby ghost, Sethe and Paul D ignore the
signs. For instance, when she first shows up at Sethe's doorstep, Beloved
appears as a young woman out of nowhere, who had "new skin, lineless
and smooth," and who appears to have cholera because she cannot stay
awake, drinks copious amounts of water, and has a "low and rough
voice."'129 But Denver denies that she is sick, assumes Beloved is her sister,
and nurses her through her transition from the other side, going so far as to
hide Beloved's incontinence. 130 Like a baby, Beloved craves sugar, her
breath "was exactly like new milk," she chokes on food, and "she behaved
like a two-year-old."' 31  Like a supernatural being, however, she is
unnaturally strong, she can disappear and reappear, she almost strangles
Sethe with invisible fingers, and her palms have no lines. 132 When Denver
asks, "What's it like over there, where you were before," Beloved tells her:
"Dark... I'm small in that place. I'm like this here [curled up] .... Hot.
Nothing to breathe down there and no room to move in .... A lot of people
125. MORRISON, supra note 1, at 18.
126. Id. at 19.
127. Id. at 29, 35-37.
128. MORRISON, supra note 1, at 12, 55. The baby ghost's attack upon Here Boy had been
more than just spiteful: "when the baby spirit picked up Here Boy and slammed him into the
wall hard enough to break two of his legs and dislocate his eye, so hard he went into
convulsions and chewed up his tongue, [her mother] ... had taken a hammer, knocked the
dog unconscious, wiped away the blood and saliva, pushed his eye back in his head and set
his leg bones. He recovered, mute and off-balance, more because of his untrustworthy eye
than his bent legs, and winter, summer, drizzle or dry, nothing could persuade him to enter
the house again." Id. at 12.
129. Id. at 50-55.
130. Id. at 54-55.
131. Id. at 55, 67, 98; see also, Jean Wyatt, Giving Body to the Word: The Maternal
Symbolic in Toni Morrison's Beloved, 108 PMLA 474, 481 (May 1993) (discussing the
connection between Beloved and Sethe as a "preoedipal understanding that the mother is an
extension of the self.").
132. MORRISON, supra note 1, at 56, 122-23 (she disappears in the cold house); Id. at 264
(she disappears in the last scene of the novel); Id. at 96, 101 (she strangles Sethe); Id. at 254
(the Bodwin's housekeeper realizes that Beloved is supernatural because she has no lines in
her hands).
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is down there. Some is dead." '133
Beloved's desire for Sethe is all-consuming, and she begs Sethe for
stories about her past, such as the time she asks, "Where your diamonds?"
which prompts Sethe to tell her about the time Mrs. Garner gave her "a pair
of crystal earrings" as a wedding present.134 However, despite her desire
for Sethe, Beloved seduces Paul D. The chapter describing her seduction
begins with the sentence, "She moved him," and goes on to describe how
Beloved literally moves Paul D out of the house - little by little he
inexplicably stops sleeping with Sethe, and sleeps first in the rocker, then
in Baby Suggs's room, then in the storeroom, then the cold house.'
35
Finally Paul D "realized the moving was involuntary. He wasn't being
nervous; he was being prevented," and he waits for Beloved to show up in
the cold house.' 36 When she finally does, Paul D tells her to leave, but she
insists, "You have to touch me. On the inside part. And you have to call
me my name.' ' 137 After she seduces him, his tobacco tin splits open and he
cries out, "Red heart. Red heart. Red heart."'138 Thus her seduction may be
viewed as a rape that allows him to "overcome his numbing defense
mechanisms ... [and to] confront[ ] the pain that he has locked away."' 3 9
Although Paul D feels shame, he realizes that since he was "[a] grown
man fixed by a girl," it was possible that "the girl was not a girl, but
something in disguise.' 140 Sethe, on the other hand, doesn't recognize that
Beloved is supernatural until more than half-way through the novel, when
Beloved hums the nursery song Sethe made up, the song that "[n]obody
knows... but me and my children.' ' 14' Although Sethe is delighted to have
her daughter back, soon she and Beloved become locked in an emotional
combat in which Beloved "invent[s] desire" and slowly starves and
overpowers Sethe.1
42
After Beloved disappears into thin air during the community exorcism
led by Ella, Paul D asks Denver, "You think she sure 'nough your sister?"
and Denver responds, "At times. At times I think she was - more."'143 In
explaining the different levels Beloved symbolizes, Morrison has said,
She is a spirit on one hand, literally she is what Sethe thinks she is,
her child returned to her from the dead .... She is also another
kind of dead which is not spiritual but flesh, which is, a survivor
133. Id. at 75.
134. Id. at 57-59.
135. Id. at 114-16.
136. Id. at 116.
137. Id. at 117.
138. Id. His heart is in a tobacco tin because of his past traumas. See supra at Part I.B.1.
139. Barnett, supra note 74, at 423.
140. MORRISON, supra note 1, at 127.
141. Id. at 176.
142. Id. at 240-43.
143. Id. at 266.
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from the true, factual slave ship. She speaks the language, a
traumatized language, of her own experience, which blends
beautifully in her questions and answers, her preoccupations, with
the desires of Denver and Sethe. So that when they say "What was
it like over there?" they may mean - they do mean - "What was
it like being dead?" She tells them what it was like being where
she was on that ship as a child. Both things are possible, and
there's evidence in the text so that both things could be
approached, because the language of both experiences - death and
the Middle Passage - is the same. Her yearning would be the
same, the love and yearning for the face that was going to smile at
her.'"
So, according to Morrison, Beloved symbolizes not only the dead
child, but also the Middle passage. 45 Another reader, Pamela Barnett, has
interpreted Beloved as "a succubus, a female demon and nightmare figure
that sexually assaults male sleepers and drains them of semen," which
Morrison employs in the novel in order "to represent the effects of
institutionalized rape under slavery."' 146 For all the rich symbolism Beloved
suggests, she also represents the subject of infanticide, and gives the reader
an opportunity and model to view Sethe's incomprehensible act with "other
love."
II. CONSTRUCTION OF MOTHERHOOD AND OF
INFANTICIDE
Legal discourse shapes definitions not merely of laws, but also of
institutions, including the institution of motherhood. 47  Much has been
written about the legal construction of motherhood.148  For instance,
Dorothy Roberts notes that while "[m]otherhood has very different
meanings in different contexts of race, class, sexual orientation, and so on,"
motherhood is constructed by "both racist and patriarchal ideology.',
149
144. Darling, supra note 18, at 247.
145. See Wyatt, supra note 131, at 479-80; Ashe, supra note 14, at 1034.
146. Barnett, supra note 74, at 418-19.
147. See Tobin, supra note 14, at 233-34; cf Susan Ayres, Coming Out: Decision-Making
in State and Federal Sodomy Cases, 62 ALB. L. REV. 355 (1998) (examining how legal
decisions construct the "straight mind"); cf Jason A. Gillmer, Suing for Freedom:
Interracial Sex, Slave Law, and Racial Identity in the Post-Revolutionary and Antebellum
South, 82 N.C.L. Rev. (forthcoming Jan. 2004) (noting, through an analysis of mixed-race
slaves' suits for freedom, how the law shaped the stories and the stories shaped the law).
148. See e.g., Carol Sangar, M Is for the Many Things, I S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 15, 36 (1992) ("We breath[e] in a kind of background purity when it comes to
mothers.").
149. Dorothy Roberts, The Unrealized Power of Mother, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 141,
147, 149 (1995).
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Martha Fineman has also written extensively about the construction of
motherhood, and how "[m]ale norms and male understandings fashioned
legal definitions of what constituted a family, what was good mothering,
who had claims and access to children as well as to jobs and education,
and, ultimately, how legal institutions functioned to give or deny redress
for alleged (and defined) harms."' 50  This article furthers this feminist
project by exploring three ways in which legal decisions construct notions
of motherhood in the context of infanticide-by specularizing women, by
silencing women, and by labeling mothers who kill as either "bad" or
"mad"'' - and proposes an alternative approach to viewing these cases
with "other love." Subsequent parts of this article examine specific cases
of Texas infanticides to explore how legal discourse shapes notions of
mothering.
A. LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF MOTHERHOOD
Legal discourse shapes motherhood in several ways. First, law
specularizes women. To specularize means to see as "the other," to deny a
subjectivity to "woman," and rather, to see "woman" as the reflection of
the male ego. As the French philosopher Luce Irigaray argues, "all of
western discourse and culture displays the structure of specularization, in
which the male projects his own ego on to the world, which then becomes a
mirror which enables him to see his own reflection wherever he looks.' 52
This specularization is one effect of "the ways in which patriarchal
systems of representation always submit women to models and images
defined by and for men ... [W]omen are seen as variations or versions of
masculinity.., two sexual symmetries.., are reduced to one (the male),
which takes it upon itself to adequately represent the other.' '153 As Sheila
Duncan states in her analysis of prostitution and rape cases, "The universal
legal subject is the male subject. The subject which the law constructs is
the male subject. There is no female subject in the text of the criminal law.
The woman appears only as the mirror to male subjectivity." '154
In terms of motherhood, patriarchal representations "require that
women appear to be completely devoted to their children and inhibit
150. Martha A. Fineman, Preface to MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL
REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD ix, x (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin, eds.
1995).
151. CHERYL MEYER & MICHELLE OBERMAN, MOTHERS WHO KILL THEIR CHILDREN:
UNDERSTANDING THE ACTS OF MOMS FROM SUSAN SMITH TO THE "PROM MOM" 69 (2001);
see also Ashe, supra note 14, at 1018-19.
152. MARGARET WHITFORD, LUCE IRIGARAY 34 (1991). Irigaray's theory plays off
Lacan's description of the mirror stage of development, in which the infant's ego, or "I," is
an identification with the image of itself which it sees reflected in a mirror. Id.
153. Id.
154. Sheila Duncan, The Mirror Tells its Tale: Constructions of Gender in Criminal Law,
in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON THE FOUNDATIONAL SUBJECTS OF LAW, 173, 177-78 (Anne
Bottomley, ed., Cavendish Publ. 1996).
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viewing the mother multi-dimensionally and as an individual separate from
her child."' 55 The specularized ideal mother
embodies an unrealistic and oppressive standard . . . "[m]others are
expected to perform a series of visible and non-visible tasks, all of
which are never-ending. Mothers are not allowed to fail any of
these obligations. The ideal of motherhood is sacred; it exposes all
mothers as imperfect." The "good mother" is expected to sacrifice
herself for the greater good of her family by nurturing, caring, and
taking responsibility for children and home. Within the nuclear
family, it is still considered natural that mothers have a special
bond with their children while fathers remain distant. "Mothers'
love is unconditional and nurturing; fathers' love is earned."' 5
6
A similar observation can be made about the construction of mothers
who commit infanticide, as demonstrated below, in which legal systems
specularize women who kill their children by projecting a masculine view
upon the facts of the case.
A second and corollary problem regarding the construction of
motherhood is that social institutions, including law, silence women., 57 In
terms of motherhood, patriarchal systems ignore women's experience and
construct versions of "motherhood" and "infanticide" by "us[ing]
disempowering language."' 5 8 Law silences "the complexity of women's
lives as mothers" and posits women as "the other, the object of the male
gaze, the subject of the discussion, not the speaker."' 59  Specifically,
155. Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 683, 782-83 (2001). See also Caroline Rogus, Note, Conflating Women's
Biological and Sociological Roles: The Ideal of Motherhood, Equal Protection, and the
Implications of the Nguyen v. INS Opinion, 5. U. PA. J. CONST. L. 803 (2003) (examining
the United State Supreme Court's stereotypical image of women in Nguyen v. INS) and
arguing that "[w]hen we as a society presume that women who become biological mothers
will immediately transform into nurturers and caretakers, we give women little choice but to
function within society's gender-biased paradigm of parenthood." Id. at 818-19, 830; April
Cherry, Nurturing in the Service of White Culture: Racial Subordination, Gestational
Surrogacy, and the Ideology of Motherhood, 10 TEX. J WOMEN & L. 83, 98-103 (2001)
(describing characteristics of the "cult of womanhood").
156. Linda J. Panko, Legal Backlash: The Expanding Liability of Women Who Fail to
Protect Their Children from Their Male Partner's Abuse, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 67, 75
(1995) (footnotes omitted).
157. See e.g., Susan Ayres, Incest in "A Thousand Acres ": Cheap Trick or Feminist Re-
Vision? 11 TEX. J. OF WOMEN & L. 131, 143, 149-51 (2001). Mary Becker points out that
oftentimes it is women themselves who maintain this silence for various emotional and
socio-legal reasons. Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1
S. CAL. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 162-65 (1992). My point is that patriarchal
specularization represses women's experience as mothers, and that women should not keep
this silence. See infra Part II B.
158. Tobin, supra note 14, at 233-34.
159. Id. at 234-35 (quoting Heilbrun & Resnik); see also Ashe, supra note 14, at 1021-22
(discussing how lawyers may silence their clients who are mothers).
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"aspects of motherhood that legal definitions miss or ignore . . . [include]
the law's insistence on the separability and self-sufficiency of the subject
[which] cannot satisfactorily account for the mother-child bond. 160
Likewise, law fails to reflect the complexity of motherhood as "neither
a natural source of women's power nor an inherently or entirely oppressive
occupation., 161  By identifying women with mothering, society "excuses
others from responsibility." 162 Mothers may be silent, especially about the
difficulties of caring for children and of their bonds with children, because
"they may quite reasonably fear that were they to express fully their pain
and the intensity of their feelings for, and identity with children, they
would be viewed as hysterical, overinvolved, and unfit.
1 63
Race is another silenced factor that shapes constructions of motherhood
because the image of the idealized mother is based on "white American
middle class. 164 As Dorothy Roberts persuasively argues, "[t]he cherished
icon of the mother nurturing her child is also imbued with racial imagery.
Black mothers' bonds with their children have been marked by brutal
disruption, beginning with the slave auction where family members were
sold to different masters and continuing in the disproportionate state
removal of Black children to foster care." 1 65 And even today, society views
Black mothers as "outside the class labeled 'ideal mothers.'
' 166
Additionally, the importance of the mother's unspoken injuries cannot
be dismissed. Based on her experience representing many women, Marie
Ashe concludes: "I believe that the injuries inflicted upon children are
directly related to injuries suffered by their mothers (and fathers) in their
lives. I hold this belief because everything I have seen in my practice has
supported it and nothing has contradicted it."' 167  Legal decisions about
infanticide more often than not silence the mother's story by suppressing
the complexities of motherhood and by failing to consider the mother's
race, socio-economic status, education, or other relevant factors.
The third problem is that in cases of infanticide, law tends to construct
160. ARISTODEMOU, supra note 13, at 224. But see Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Social
Constructions of Mothering: A Thematic Overview, in MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE,
AND AGENCY 1, 13 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn et. al. eds., 1994) (arguing against treating
mother and child as a single entity).
161. Roberts, supra note 149, at 143.
162. Glenn, supra note 160, at 13.
163. See Becker, supra note 155, at 162.
164. Glenn, supra note 160, at 3; see also Rogus, supra note 155, at 818.
165. Roberts, supra note 149, at 146
166. Id.; Adrian Katherine Wing and Laura Weselmann, Transcending Traditional
Notions of Mothering: The Need for Critical Race Feminist Praxis, 3 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 257, 273 (1999).
167. Marie Ashe, Postmodernism, Legal Ethics, and Representation of "Bad Mothers, " in
MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD 142,
158-59 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin, eds. 1995).
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the mother as "mad or bad"'168 because no good or sane mother would kill
her child. 69  In contrast, the father who kills his child is not similarly
judged, and is seen "sometimes as [acting] within [his] 'rights' ... a right
connected to the responsibilities of paternity and the expectations of
violence associated with the patriarchy."'170 Murder of a child by a mother
is seen as "a social transgression of extreme proportions .... In killing her
child, the infanticidal mother directly challenges male authority, and the
male-dominant family structure."'' So the mother who kills her child is
seen as "deficient, dangerous, and evil" and "whose neglectful, abusive,
reckless, or even murderous behaviors threaten or destroy her children.' 72
This view of "mad or bad" mothers has "force[d] the mother's experience
into binary oppositions - indifferent/obsessive, narcissistic/self-
sacrificing, overprotecti(,e/dutiful.' 73
B. OTHER LOVE
Although law constructs motherhood in these three ways, this article
argues for an alternative. Rather than ground expectations of motherhood
in a universal experience, law should be open to an array of individual
experiences. If the mother is given the opportunity to articulate her
experience, then listeners (families, the public, law enforcement) will have
a way to respond to the mother not as the "mad or bad" other, but as a
168. MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 151, at 69. See also, Panko, supra note 156, at 74-
75 (examining how "the male-legal system holds women to a male-defined standard of
'good mother' conduct" in failure-to- protect laws).
169. See, e.g., Horrifying Yates Saga Presents Unsatisfying Legal Options, ASHVILLE
CITIZEN-TIMES, Mar. 7, 2002 at 6 (unsigned editorial), available at 2002 WL 21100237
("There's much argument about whether Yates is insane. Of course she is. She chased
down her children and wrestled them to their death beside the floating bodies of siblings.
The woman committed the highest crime, filicide."); Kathleen Parker, Who's Insane,
GRAND RAPIDS PR., Aug. 17, 2001, at A7, available at 2001 WL 25383865 ("Any mother
who systematically chases down and drowns her own children, including a gangly 7-year-
old boy and a helpless 6-month-old girl, is clearly out of her mind.")
170. Susan Sage Heinzelman, "Going Somewhere": Maternal Infanticide and the Ethics
of Judgment, in LITERATURE AND LEGAL PROBLEM SOLVING: LAW AND LITERATURE AS
ETHICAL DISCOURSE 73, 74 (Paul J. Heald ed., 1998). According to statistics for Texas,
homicides of sons are committed by fathers in 54.7% of the cases, and by mothers in 45.3%
of the cases; homicides of daughters are committed by fathers in 49.3% of the cases, and by
mothers in 50.7% of the cases. These statistics do not break down the ages of the children.
See JAMES ALAN Fox, INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
RESEARCH, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS [UNITED STATES], SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE
REPORTS, 1976-1999, PART 1: VICTIM DATA, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cgi/SDA12/hsda3.
Moreover, national statistics for infanticides of children under age five from 1976-2000
reveal that 31% were killed by fathers and 30% were killed by mothers. See U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE U.S. (INFANTICIDE),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/children.htm.
171. Karin Lewicki, Can You Forgive Her?: Legal Ambivalence Toward Infanticide, 8 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 683, 685 (1999).
172. See Ashe, supra note 14, at 1019-20; Marie Ashe and Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse:
A Problem For Feminist Theory, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN& L. 75, 80-81 (1993).
173. Tobin, supra note 14, at 236.
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speaking subject. 7 4  Listeners can respond to an array of individual
experience stories of mothering with "other love."
"Other love" contrasts with what usually happens when one is
classified as "other," as one separate and different, as one lesser than, and
usually despised. The French philosopher H6lne Cixous explains the
concept of the "other" as follows: "What is the 'Other?' . . . in History...
what is called 'other' is ... the other in a hierarchically organized
relationship in which the same is what rules, names, defines and assigns
'its' other." 175  In short, the dominant "same" (generally the universal,
patriarchal position) exists in a hierarchical relationship with the "other."
As an alternative to the hierarchical relationship of the "same" and "other,"
Cixous proposes "other love" as an exchange in which one is able "[t]o
love, to watch-think-seek the other in the other, to despecularize, to
unhoard.' ' 176 Listening to another with "other love" becomes possible once
we acknowledge Emmanuel Levinas's belief that our selfhood is "the
responsibility for the Other, being-for-the other.",177 In fact, acknowledging
this makes it impossible "to stand apart, to separate oneself from the
suffering or the cruelty of others.' 78 As discussed above, however, all too
often law echoes the dominant patriarchy, which does not give recognition
to, does not hear the other because it "coercively maintains antiquated,
totalizing, overarching images of women that reflect beliefs and
assumptions within society."'
79
An example of patriarchal thinking is the argument that in cases of
infanticide society ought to place the blame squarely on the mothers, rather
than shift blame to other factors and thus "reduce the accountability of
young mothers committing this horrific crime."' 80 The refusal to consider
174. Tobin argues that "the truth of legal disputes involving mothers is not likely to be
recognized in the legal system until attorneys and judges explore the ambiguities of the
maternal experience as expressed from the mother's perspective" (emphasis in original).
Id. at 237. I generally agree, but disagree with Tobin's emphasis on "truth" because I
question whether there is an objective truth out there.
175. Cixous, supra note 15, at 71; see also Ashe, supra note 167, at 147-48.
176. HELENE CIXOUS, LAUGH 264 (Elaine Marks & Isabelle de Courtivron eds. 1981).
177. Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Phillippe Nemo 52
(Richard A. Cohen trans., 1985). See also, Ayres, supra note 147, at 395-96 (discussing
Levinas's ethics of alterity).
178. Heinzelman, supra note 170, at 79.
179. Fineman, supra note 150, at xii.
180. Lynne Marie Kohm and Thomas Scott Liverman, Prom Mom Killers: The Impact of
Blame Shift and Distorted Statistics on Punishment for Neonaticide, 9 WM. AND MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 43, 49 (2002). The authors define feminist "blame shifting" as "following a
similar pattern": "It starts the blame shifting with a broad-brush stroke by including all of
society, and the 'patriarchal system' that is in place. Then, it narrows the focus to the
oppressive nature of motherhood, and the lack of gratitude all mothers receive for their
efforts as mothers. Finally, the task is often to reduce the generalities to a specific party
who should shoulder more of the blame than the mother. This 'scapegoat' is often times the
father of the children, or someone who has exerted influence over the mother ....
Additionally, the lack of quality medical and mental health care is a common target of
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"other factors" perpetuates antiquated concepts. Without other love, stories
are repressed, voices are suppressed - especially the stories and voices of
women and minorities. As Oberman notes, "We know relatively little
about actual women who have killed their children."'181
As the next part of this article argues, it is difficult to hear accounts of
infanticide, much less to hear them as potential tales of love. Our
stereotyped response to the "mad or bad" mother is to either blame her for
her unnatural agency or to pity her "for her victimization, for her utter lack
of choice., 18 2 Seldom is our response based on a contextualized account by
a speaking subject. Morrison provides this contextualized and multi-vocal
account in her novel, which can serve as a model for our responses.
To read "Sethe's murder of Beloved [as] tak[ing] place out of a love
that is not guided by rationality but is singular, unique, and unrepeatable"
has the effect of "explod[ing] the language of the law which insists on
singular, fixed, and precise meanings.' 8 3  Such a reading can challenge
constructions of motherhood and of infanticide because "once you have
heard another's story, you cannot return to the judgments produced by
ignorance of that narrative."'814 And more practically, perhaps, as Marie
Ashe argues, our response to literature such as Beloved can provide a
,185model for lawyers struggling to represent "'bad mother' clients." By
listening to mother's painful stories, Elizabeth Tobin hopes that "we can
change the law so it acknowledges [these] experiences."' 8 6  Before
considering legal constructions and responses to Texas cases of infanticide,
the next part of this article will consider responses to the infanticides of
Margaret Garner and Sethe.
III. REACTIONS TO INFANTICIDE IN BELOVED AND
MODERN MEDEA
As Maria Aristodemou and other readers have pointedly remarked,
"[i]n the gallery of western literature there are few figures more powerful
blame." Id. at 61-62. What the authors label blame shifting I see as part of an attempt to
understand how society and legal discourse constructs motherhood. I am not arguing that
mothers should be relieved of blame.
181. Michelle Oberman, Understanding Infanticide in Context: Mothers Who Kill, 1870-
1930 and Today, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 707, 736 (2002).
182. Ashe and Cahn, supra note 172, at 84.
183. ARISTODEMOU, supra note 13, at 226; see also Ashe, supra note 14, at 1035.
184. Heinzelman, supra note 170, at 79.
185. Ashe, supra note 14, at 1017, 1022. See also Cynthia M. Dennis, Expanding
Students' Views of the Dilemmas of Womanhood and Motherhood Through Individual
Client Representation, 46 How. L.J. 269, 290 (2003) (in describing how her clinic students
fail to empathize with low-income mothers, she notes that "[t]hey do not necessarily see the
person beyond the legal problem").
186. Tobin, supra note 14, at 272-73.
and terrifying than that of the mother who kills her children."' 87
Morrison's tale of a murderous mother is powerful and terrifying to both
the reader and to Sethe's community, to Schoolteacher and the white
community, to Sethe's family and friends, and to Beloved. This section
examines fictional reactions to Sethe's murder, real reactions to Margaret's
murder, and critical reactions to Sethe's murder in order to show how
difficult it is to respond to infanticide with love for the (m)other.
Whereas the historical pro-slavery activists and the abolitionists co-
opted Gamer's actions to further their own goals, the characters in Beloved
project their own motivations to explain Sethe's murder. All failed to
understand the circumstances from the mother's perspective. Both the
critical reactions to Beloved as well as Morrison's own comments show a
way to respond to the infanticide with love for the other, and the next part
of this article discusses the difficulties of responding to "real" cases of
infanticide in the same way - with love for the (m)other.
A. HISTORICAL REACTION IN MODERN MEDEA
Although we really do not know how the black community reacted to
Margaret Garner's infanticide, we do know how the legal community and
political community responded. In general, Margaret's act was viewed
sympathetically by the abolitionists as evidence of the horrors of slavery,
while her act was viewed unsympathetically by the proslavery faction as
evidence that slaves were subhuman. 88  For instance, the rousing
courtroom speech of the famous abolitionist, Lucy Stone, included the
following points:
Who that knows the depths of a mother's love does not estimate
the sacrifice she had made? If she had a right to deliver her child,
she had a right to deliver herself, so help me Heaven! ... The
faded faces of the negro children tell too plainly to what
degradation the female slaves submit. Rather than give her little
daughter to that life, she killed it. 18 9
Other abolitionist writers and newspapers mythologized Margaret's act
in poems and essays "[depicting] her infanticide as a cultural icon, whose
power to figure political and social agendas and tensions did not require
being true to specific, complex facts," but rather, "[s]uch icons of the all-
loving parent - a type of female Abraham, knife upraised over her
sacrificial child... were intended to strike the familiar chord of a
transcending and even a healing horror." 190
187. ARISTODEMOU, supra note 13, at 222. See also supra text accompanying note 8.
188. WEISENBURGER, supra note 16, at 5-6.
189. Id. at 172-73; see also COFFIN, supra note 21, at 564-56.
190. WEISENBURGER, supra note 16, at 247. Weisenberger describes the idealized
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Proslavery accounts and references to Margaret, on the other hand,
blamed "the 'disorganizing, law-breaking, meddling abolitionist fanatics'
who.., tempted Margaret away from Maplewood intending to make of her
a public sacrifice."'' Also, some proslavery authors' reliance on ideas of
polygenesis z compelled them to explain Margaret's act of killing her
child, which they labeled unnatural because they viewed blacks as too
simple-minded to carry out such an act, and expected black mothers to have
"an absolute, instinctual protectiveness over their children."' 93
Consequently, proslavery writers either blamed the abolitionists for
Margaret's act, or else they pointed to the observation that Margaret herself
was not pure, but was a mulatto, in which case her "unnatural crime was
quite possible, as indeed any unnatural vice or crime is always possible in
the mixed element."'
' 94
Because Margaret became an icon, her actual circumstances were
forgotten and she "practically disappeared from written history.,
195
Modern Medea theorizes that actually, Margaret had "a tangled skein of
motives: despairing desires to 'save' her children, urges for violent
backlash against the master who had probably made her his concubine and
who might in turn victimize little Mary, and a destructive spite for her
children's whiteness that was in every sense Massa's 'property,' his
'right,', 1 96 as well as "signs that she was motivated by sexual abuse.' 97
However, nineteenth-century society failed to acknowledge these motives,
but relied on stereotypical notions of a slave mother.
B. COMMUNITY REACTION IN BELOVED
The white community in Beloved mirrors the historical reaction
recorded in Modern Medea. White abolitionists in Beloved "managed to
turn infanticide and the cry of savagery around, and build a further case for
abolishing slavery. ' 9 In contrast, those in favor of slavery viewed Sethe's
act as "testimony to the results of a little so-called freedom imposed on
people who needed every care and guidance in the world to keep them from
abolitionist texts as "formulat[ing] a set of absolute equivalences: Death=Liberty=Divine.
Thus they attempt to spirit ethical judgment away from the contingent, historical realities of
enslaved people and into a domain of absolutes. Try as they may, however, these icons are
still freighted with contradictions and tend to treat slave mothers' actions and motives as
being wholly enigmatic." Id. at 256. See also, COFFIN, supra note 21, at 562.
191. WEISENBURGER, supra note 16, at 264.
192. Polygenesis was the theory that all of mankind did not descend from Adam, but saw
"whites and blacks not as alternate varieties of man but as wholly different species." Id. at
266. See also, supra at Part I.B.2 (Schoolteacher in Beloved probably believed in
polygenesis).
193. WEISENBURGER, supra note 16, at 266.
194. Id. at 267.
195. Id. at 258.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 262.
198. Id. at 260.
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the cannibal life they preferred."1 99 Schoolteacher asserted the polygenesis
theory that Sethe was no different from an animal - "see what happened
when you overbeat creatures God had given you the responsibility of...
you just can't mishandle creatures and expect success."200
Although the reaction of the white community in Beloved mimics
history, Morrison presents more complex responses to Sethe's actions than
exist in the historical record. In fact, we have little record of how the black
community reacted to Margaret's act - Morrison invents this in Beloved.
Specifically, although Sethe sees her actions as resulting from love, her
family and community do not. Ella, for instance, wants nothing to do with
Sethe after the murder, and tells Stamp Paid, "I ain't got no friends take a
handsaw to their own children., 20 1 Ella categorically rejects Sethe's action
as wrong even though after Ella had been raped by "the lowest yet," she let
her own baby, "a hairy white thing," die by refusing to nurse it.202 Thus,
based on her own experience, Ella "understood Sethe's rage in the shed
twenty years ago, but not her reaction to it, which Ella thought was
prideful, misdirected, and Sethe herself too complicated. 20 3
Stamp Paid explains another motivation to Paul D, proposing that
Sethe acted out of revenge in an attempt to "to out-hurt the hurter., 204
Perhaps Stamp Paid sees Sethe's murder as revenge, projecting the desire
for revenge based on a projection of his own desire for revenge when his
master had sexually co-opted his wife - Stamp Paid wanted to kill both
his master and his own wife, but instead approached the mistress and made
an allusion to her husband's infidelity.20 5 Ironically, neither Ella nor Stamp
Paid can understand Sethe's actions because they specularize her as other,
as a vengeful mother-killer. None of the characters can understand that
kind of love.
Even Paul D, Sethe's lover, fails to demonstrate other love, but also
specularizes her. Paul D confronts Sethe and insinuates that she acted like
an animal because she doesn't fit his ideal of motherhood:
"What you did was wrong, Sethe."
"I should have gone on back there? Taken my babies back there?"
"There could have been a way. Some other way."
"What way?"
199. Id. at 151.
200. Id. at 150.
201. MORRISON, supra note 1, at 187.
202. Id. at 256.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 234.
205. Id. at 232-33.
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"You got two feet, Sethe, not four."20 6
Paul D accuses her of acting like an animal, based on a projection of
his own animal instincts, as he later realizes: "How fast he had moved from
his shame to hers. From his cold-house secret [of having sex with
Beloved] straight to her too-thick love. 2 °7
The characters fail to view Sethe with other love, but project what they
208want to see. They specularize her by imposing their own stories on her
action. Sethe's surviving daughter, Denver, says, "I love my mother but I
know she killed one of her own daughters, and tender as she is with me,
I'm scared of her because of it."520 9 Consequently, Denver is terrified of the
outside world because she is "afraid the thing that happened that made it all
right for my mother to kill my sister could happen again., 210 Denver, who
was born out of slavery and lived isolated at 124, has no knowledge or
experience of what can dirty you. Rather, she, like the other characters,
specularizes Sethe as "other," as a monstrous mother who killed her
baby.
211
C. THE MOTHER'S EXPLANATION: SETHE'S "TOO THICK" LOVE AND
FEMININE ETHICS
Rather than see Sethe as other, we can try to see the infantacide
through Sethe's eyes, as an action based on "thick love." 212 Morrison, in an
interview given after she wrote the novel, refused to condone the murder;
she said "although it was the right thing to do Sethe had no right to do
it.''213 Morrison's view is echoed in the novel by Baby Suggs, who "could
not approve or condemn Sethe's rough choice" because "[t]hey came in her
yard anyway. ''2 14 Even if, as readers, we cannot condone Sethe's action,
perhaps we can apply the concept of "other love" to imagine the horrific
circumstances that prodded Sethe to kill "her best thing."
The usefulness of this approach is both that it can possibly make us
better lawyers, as Ashe and others have argued,215 but also that it can make
206. Id. at 164-65 (emphasis added).
207. Id. at 165.
208. See Ashe, supra note 14, at 1026 (analyzing how other characters "nam[e] her act as
'bad,").
209. MORRISON, supra note 1, at 205.
210. Id.
211. For instance, even her own children "made up die-witch! stories with proven ways of
killing her dead." Id. at 19.
212. Id. at 165.
213. ARISTODEMOU, supra note 13, at 226 (quoting Danille Taylor-Guthrie, ed.,
CONVERSATIONS WITH TONI MORRISON, 272 (U. Miss. Pr, 19940); see also Ashe, supra note
14, at 1036 ("Beloved reminds us that there is no 'last word' by which we can dismiss the
'bad mother' - whether that word be 'unfit,' 'evil,' 'unnatural,' or 'insane').
214. ARISTODEMOU, supra note 13, at 180.
215. Ashe, supra note 14, at 1036-37 (noting that "Sethe truly embodies the bad mother as
speaking subject").
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us better humans, capable of hearing the characters' repressed stories of
slavery. As Morrison has commented:
no one speaks, no one tells the story about himself or herself unless
forced. They don't want to talk, they don't want to remember, they
don't want to say it, because they're afraid of it - which is human.
But when they do say it, and hear it, and look at it, and share it,
they are not only one, they're two, and three, and four... The
collective sharing of that information heals the individual - and
216the collective.
Thus, in listening to stories of infanticide, do we allow the mother to
tell her story, or do we read the objective facts and try to label the
infanticide based on idealizing views of mothering? In her discussion
about the construction of mothering, Evelyn Nakano Glenn warns that
relying on "universals that characterize mothers and mothering is probably
fruitless., 2 17 For instance, the purportedly universal idea that mothering
involves preserving life has to be qualified, such as for Christian Scientist
parents who refuse medical treatment for a child who later dies: "Here we
see that people in nonextreme circumstances can both cherish their children
and assert priorities that may take precedence over preserving their
lives. ' ,2 18  Morrison shows us a similar result in Beloved's extreme
circumstances. She also shows that although categories of infanticide may
be useful for grouping motivations and circumstances of infanticide, even
with such categories, we may well fail to acknowledge the mother's story.
In Beloved, the mother's story is one of "thick love." Indeed, the very
title and the novel's epigraph frame the topic of love. The epigraph, from
the book of Romans, states: "I will call them my people, which were not
my people; and her beloved, which was not beloved., 219 Like the epigraph,
the novel circles around the tension of "beloved, which was not beloved."
Was the murdered baby loved or not? Did Sethe kill her out of motherly
love or irrational animal instincts - or is this binary choice an
oversimplication?
Sethe's murdered baby, whose given name is never revealed in the
novel, is called "Beloved" after the only words Sethe heard the preacher
say at the funeral. 220  The preacher's traditional address of "Dearly
Beloved" is heard by Sethe as an address to her dead baby, perhaps because
it was Sethe's "thick love" that motivated the murder when Schoolteacher,
216. Darling, supra note 18, at 248.
217. Glenn, supra note 160, at 25.
218. Id. at 25-26.
219. Romans 9:25. The passage is an allusion to the book of Hosea, and refers to God's
election of Israel as a chosen people.
220. MORRISON, supra note 1, at 5.
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221her master, appeared to reclaim her.
As she explains to her lover, Paul D, when he finally hears the story of
the murder and judges "[her] love [as] too thick":
"Too thick?" she said .... "Love is or it ain't. Thin love ain't love
at all."
"Yeah. It didn't work, did it? Did it work?" he asked.
"It worked," she said."
"They ain't at Sweet Home. Schoolteacher ain't got em."
"Maybe there's worse."
"It ain't my job to know what's worse. It's my job to know what is
and to keep them away from what I know is terrible. I did that.
' 222
Sethe's motivation was to keep her children away from the evils of
slavery, especially the horrors of rape, because "[f]or Sethe, being brutally
overworked, maimed, or killed is subordinate to the overarching horror of
being raped and 'dirtied' by whites. 223 The other characters judge Sethe's
love for her children as too much, as inappropriate. Paul D, for instance,
thinks her love is "very risky. For a used-to-be-slave woman to love
anything that much was dangerous, especially if it was her children she had
settled on to love. '224 And Ella says, "If anybody was to ask me I'd say,
'Don't love nothing."' 225 Their views reflect the reality of mothering in a
time of slavery when children were often separated from their mothers, as
Sethe herself had been. 6
Sethe rejects this reality of mother's love. In contrast, Sethe's "thick
227love" defines the mother in terms of her children. For instance, when she
221. See Ashe, supra note 14, at 1026 ("Sethe consistently characterized the murder as
'good' - as an act of love" - for the daughter on whose tombstone she had engraved...
the single word: 'Beloved"').
222. MORRISON, supra note 1, at 164-65.
223. Barnett, supra note 74, at 419. Indeed, Barnett argues that "Morrison revises the
conventional slave narrative by insisting on the primacy of sexual assault over other
experiences of brutality." Id. at 420.
224. MORRISON, supra note 1, at 45.
225. Id. at 92.
226. Id. at 62 (Nan, who watched the young children, pointed out which woman was
Sethe's mother and told Sethe that her mother had been repeatedly raped: "'She threw them
all away but you... You she gave the name of the black man. She put her arms around
him'); (Baby Suggs loses all of her children except Halle and learns the cruel lesson that
"nobody stopped playing checkers just because the pieces included her children.") Id. at 23.
227. ARISTODEMOU, supra note 13, at 224.
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runs to Ohio and finally collapses, she says, "I believe this baby's ma'am is
gonna die., 228 The love that blurs the boundary between mother and child
is shared by Beloved, who displays an infant's preoedipal and "preverbal
child's dependence on the maternal face as a mirror of her own
existence.,, 229 As depicted in the highly poetic and nonlinear chapter that
merges the voices of Denver, Sethe, and Beloved, the voices of the three
converge in the final stanzas:
Beloved
You are my sister
You are my daughter
You are my face; you are me
I have found you again; you have come back to me
You are my Beloved
You are mine
You are mine
230
You are mine.
Denver describes this mutual blending between Sethe and Beloved:
"Sometimes coming upon them making men and women cookies or tacking
scraps of cloth on Baby Suggs's old quilt, it was difficult for Denver to tell
who was who.",231 Similarly, Paul D thinks, "This here new Sethe didn't
know where the world stopped and she began. 232
Sethe's "thick love" shapes her ethics and "permit[s] Sethe to exercise
life-or-death rights over the children she conceived as 'parts of her."',
233
Because Beloved is "mine," Sethe takes her life rather than let
Schoolteacher have her. The idea of "mine," of possession and blending
between mother and child reflects "of course what the slave owners said.
In the larger social order, it reflects the disregard of the other as subject, the
228. MORRISON, supra note 1, at 31.
229. Wyatt, supra note 131, at 480.
230. MORRISON, supra note 1, at 216. See also Wyatt, supra note 131, at 481.
231. Id. at 241.
232. Id. at 164.
233. Wyatt, supra note 131, at 482 (quoting MORRISON, supra note 1, at 163.). See also,
Tobin, supra note 14, at 241 ("Sethe's murder of her own child becomes an act of struggle
over language. It represents a process of renaming - of herself as mother and of her child
as a human being and not as property owned by another").
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appropriation of the other to one's own desires, leads to violence. 234 Sethe
tells Paul D that she will never run again because "it cost too much!, 235
Even though she admits the cost, presumably she would do the same thing
again to protect her children from Schoolteacher.
While Sethe can admit to Paul D that it cost too much, she can't admit
what she actually did. Sethe's explanation to Paul D circles around the
incident, "[c]ircling, circling, now she was gnawing something else instead
of getting to the point,, 236 by explaining the "selfish pleasure [she] never
had before" such as the freedom to sew a baby dress.2 37 She tells Paul D, "I
couldn't let all that go back to where it was, and I couldn't let her nor any
of em live under schoolteacher. That was out. '238 Wyatt describes the
narrative as "dramatiz[ing] the problems of Sethe's maternal subjectivity,
which is so embedded in her children that it both allows her to take the life
of one of them and precludes putting that act into words. 2 39 Although
Sethe can't tell Paul D what happened, the narrator explains that "the truth
was simple":
[S]he was squatting in the garden and when she saw them coming
and recognized schoolteacher's hat, she heard wings. Little
hummingbirds stuck their needle beaks right through her headcloth
into her hair and beat their wings. And if she thought anything, it
was No. No. Nono. Nonono. Simple. She just flew. Collected
every bit of life she had made, all the parts of her that were
precious and fine and beautiful, and carried, pushed, dragged them
through the veil, out, away, over there where no one could hurt
them. Over there. Outside this place, where they would be safe.240
Sethe cannot fully explain to Paul D why she killed Beloved; however,
she later tries to explain her reasons to Beloved, who rejects her reasons:
"Beloved accused her of leaving her behind .... She said when she cried
there was no one. That dead men lay on top of her. That she had nothing
to eat. Ghosts without skin stuck their fingers in her and said beloved in
the dark and bitch in the light.,
241
234. Wyatt, supra note 131, at 482. This view also reflects the contemporary debate in
family law over whether children are property. See Barbara Katz Rothman, Beyond
Mothers and Fathers: Ideology in a Patriarchal Society, in MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY,
EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY, supra note 158, at 150; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Dark
Side of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1247, 1258 (1999); Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, Of Babies, Bonding, and Burning Buildings: Discerning Parenthood in
Irrational Action, 81 VA. L. REv. 2493, 2500-1 (1995).
235. MORRISON, supra note 1, at 15.
236. Id. at 162.
237. Id. at 163.
238. Id.
239. Wyatt, supra note 131, at 476.
240. MORRISON, supra note 1, at 163.
241. Id. at 241.
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Morrison's fictionalized account of the historical Margaret Garner
gives the reader an opportunity to view the mother with "other love."
Although we have suppositions, we have no historical record of Margaret
Garner's motivation to kill her child. Morrison imagines a motivation, and
in so doing, "dismantles notions of 'natural' motherhood and illustrates that
presumptions and stereotypes about race, gender, and class construct
societal roles for mothers. 242  She allows us to imagine an ethic that
possibly could have motivated a mother to kill her child. As Morrison has
stated, "[t]he vitality of language lies in its ability to limn the actual,
imagined, and possible lives of its speakers, readers, writers. Although its
poise is sometimes in displacing experience, it is not a substitute for it. It
arcs toward the place where meaning may lie. 243  We should not, of
course, confuse fiction with reality. However, as the next part of this
article argues, we should listen to and elicit contemporary stories of
infanticide with "love for the other."
IV. TEXAS CASES OF INFANTICIDE: "JURIES ARE JUST NOT
SYMPATHETIC WITH MOTHERS WHO KILL THEIR
CHILDREN IN THIS STATE. 244
Reported Texas cases of infanticide go back to the end of the
nineteenth century. These judicial decisions along with news articles
provide a glimpse at how the media and courts have responded to mothers
who have killed their children. In other words, decisions and news reports
demonstrate how juridico-legal discourse constructs mothers. While
judicial decisions, unlike literature, usually do not explicitly pass moral
judgment on these mothers, media reports tend to be more normative.
Thus, reading both media accounts and legal decisions provides evidence
of how discourse specularizes, silences, and labels mothers who kill.
This article discusses a selected sampling of judicial decisions and
media reports concerning seventeen cases of infanticide. 24' Although some
242. Tobin, supra note 14, at 241.
243. Morrison, supra note 2, at 270.
244. T.J. Milling, supra note 9 (quoting Dr. J. Ray Hays, Professor of Psychiatry at
University of Texas Medical Branch); see also David B. Caruso, Punishments Getting
Tougher for Mothers Who Kill Their Children, HouS. CHRON., May 24, 2003, at 4A,
available at 2003 WL 3261801 ("Legal experts say prosecutors are getting tougher with
mothers who kill" and Victor L. Streib, a law professor at Ohio Northern University says
these mothers "are now more likely to be sentenced to death.").
245. This article excludes cases of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy. See, e.g., United
States v. Martinez, 274 F.3d 897 (5th Cir. 2001); Reid v. State, 964 S.W.2d 723 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo, 1998). Moreover, this article excludes or merely notes several other Texas
cases that lack sufficient information to support an analysis. For instance, Torres v. State,
976 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, 1998), is omitted because it focuses on the
insanity defense, an issue outside the scope of this article. One especially well-publicized
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sociologists have based studies of infanticides on medical examiner
reports,246 infanticides are seriously underreported.247  Thus, due to
problems in reporting, the methodology of this article is to chronologically
review Texas judicial decisions and media accounts of infanticides. For
practical reasons, this article does not consider trial transcripts, which are
difficult to access for very old cases and which tend to be very expensive to
copy for capital murder cases.248 Although an analysis which relies on
judicial decisions and media accounts has limitations, it has the advantage
of illustrating ways in which legal discourse objectifies mothers. The
purpose of this chronological review is to examine how the legal system
perpetuates patriarchal constructions of motherhood. These Texas
decisions are categorized as either neonaticides (death within the baby's
first twenty-four hours) or infanticides (death after the baby's first twenty-
four hours). Infanticides are further categorized based on the four
categories developed in the book authored by Cheryl Meyer and Michelle
Oberman, Mothers Who Kill Their Children: Understanding the Acts of
Moms from Susan Smith to the "Prom Mom. ,249
Neonaticide cases generally involve a young mother who has been
isolated from her family, who suffers from financial insecurity, and who
suffers from some fear such as being kicked out of the house by angry
250parents. In neonaticides some mothers are not even charged for murder,
and of those who are, the penalties vary significantly. 25 1 Although society
views these cases with horror, Meyer and Oberman view them as
41 252
"comprehensible" given the mother's circumstances and fears.
Infanticide cases vary greatly, characteristic patterns include the
case this article omits is that of Darlie Lynn Routier, who received a sentence of death by
lethal injection for the 1996 murders of her 5- and 6-year-old sons. Routier v. State, 112
S.W.3d 554, reh'g denied Sept. 20, 2003. (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Routier's appeal did not
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, but rather, focused on problems with the accuracy
of the trial record. Her conviction was affirmed.
246. See, e.g., Martha Smithey, Maternal Infanticide and Modern Motherhood, 13 WOMEN
& CRIM. JUSTICE 65, 68-70 (2001).
247. Overpeck, supra note 7, at 19-20; MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 151, at 34-36;
Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms With Modern American
Infanticide, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1996).
248. For instance, the Andrea Yates transcript needed for her appeal cost about $105,000.
See Rick Casey, Fee Madness: Dietz Got $105K, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 24, 2003, at 21A,
available at 2003 WL 574445243. An example of an analysis that uses a trial transcript to
consider the "bad versus mad" mother narrative is found in Heinzelman's essay. See
Heinzelman, supra note 170, at 83-88 (discussing the essentializing narratives produced by
both the prosecution and the defense in the murder trial of Susan Bienek, which prevented
the jury from hearing the mother's "specific identity and story").
249. See MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 151, at 36-38.
250. Oberman, supra note 181, at 709-10; See also Norman J. Finkel et al., Commonsense
Judgments of Infanticide Murder, Manslaughter, Madness, or Miscellaneous, 6 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 1113, 1131-32 (2000).
251. Oberman, supra note 181, at 711.
252. Id. at 712.
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following: the mother is generally young, single or in a bad marriage; is
isolated from family; is not well-educated; and may suffer from either
chemical dependency or mental illness.253 Infanticides may be viewed in
four categories described by Meyer and Oberman: (1) deaths stemming
from child abuse; (2) deaths caused by maternal neglect; (3) deaths
resulting from purposeful killing; or, (4) deaths involving mothers acting
with their partners (or failing to stop their partners).254
In cases of infanticide, the mother is usually charged with murder,
although the sentences vary greatly. 255 A mother viewed as "bad" usually
receives a more severe sentence than a mother viewed as "mad.,
256
Overall, however, recent juries seem to be showing less leniency than did
juries in nineteenth- and twentieth-century cases of infanticide. 57 In fact,
studies of cases of infanticide over the past 450 years indicate "that
community sentiment changes across the span, resembling a roller coaster
- moving from a lenient-to-moderate period to a severe period, then
changing to a very lenient period, which continues well into this
century.,
258
After examining Texas cases of neonaticide and infanticide, the next
section of this article discusses the recent trial of Andrea Yates, whose life
sentence is currently on appeal.
1. RED V. STATE-NEONATICIDE OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILD -
ASSISTANCE OR COERCION FROM A PARTNER
In the 1899 case of Red v. State,259 the defendant, John Red, was the
father charged with murder of an infant; however, because John was tried
as a principal, the decision may also be read for its comments about the
infant's mother, Epsy Keith. After John's first judgment was remanded
(for error in the jury charge), he was again tried, found guilty of first degree
murder, and given a life sentence, which was affirmed on the legal theory
that John either killed the baby or was an accomplice. 260 Thus, this analysis
considers both decisions.
Epsy testified at the trial that she and the father had an "illicit"
253. Id. at 712-13.
254. MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 151, at 36-38. Although other categories have been
used to discuss infanticide, the categories found in Meyer and Oberman are well-researched
and comprehensive. See, e.g., Janet Ford, Note, Susan Smith and Other Homicidal Mothers
- In Search of the Punishment That Fits the Crime, 3 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 521, 524-28
(1996).
255. Finkel, supra note 250, at 1131, 1133.
256. Oberman, supra note 181, at 714.
257. Finkel, supra note 250, at 1133. See also, supra text accompanying note 242.
258. Id. at 1115. This roller coaster phenomenon may help explain time gaps in the cases
discussed below.
259. Red v. State, 53 S.W. 618 (Tex. Crim. App. 1899), reh'g denied, 54 S.W. 770 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1900).
260. Id.
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relationship, and that when the child was born the father "immediately took
the child from the room where it was born.., while it was still living and
crying, and that she did not see the child again., 261 Later, Epsy said, John
told her that he had buried the child "near the path leading to the spring
under the large, double oak tree. 2 62 Epsy explained the statements that she
had made to the contrary before trial - that the baby was born dead - as
having been made because "she was afraid John Red, who had threatened
her, would kill her."263John testified, on the other hand, that the child was
born alive, that Epsy was the one who had "killed the child" by suffocating
it with her hand, and that Epsy had then asked him to bury the baby.26
How has law constructed Epsy Keith? It is true that the dominant
conception of motherhood at the end of the nineteenth century was very
different from both "the indifference toward infants in previous centuries,
or the more recent focus - almost obsession with children today., 265 And
it is also the case that society's treatment of illegitimate babies was
different from today's. Before World War II, an illegitimate baby was
labeled a "child of sin" and was undesirable because "the biology of
illegitimacy stamped the baby permanently with marks of mental and moral
deficiency." 266 The mother of an illegitimate child was expected to raise it.
However, even if we consider the historical context, the decisions
strikingly specularized Epsy as a woman who had had an illicit affair, as a
narcissistic bad mother who may have killed her child. Though she
apparently was not tried, she was deeply implicated in John's trial. The
decisions, which say nothing about her race, imply that John was African-
American from the following confession by John, which included the
statements that Epsy was the one who
"killed it, and told me to go and bury it;" that he didn't want to do
that, as he was afraid that the white folks would get after him; that
Epsy said, if the white folks get after him, that she would give him
the money to leave the country on; and that she did give him the
money to leave on; and that he took the child and buried it.
267
While we may try to read between the lines, the reported cases have
silenced Epsy Keith's story and have objectified her as a vessel: the mother
261. Red v. State, 47 S.W. 1003 (Tex. Crim. App. 1898).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 619.
265. JANE SWIGART, THE MYTH OF THE BAD MOTHER: THE EMOTIONAL REALITIES OF
MOTHERrNG 9 (1991).
266. Rickie Solinger, Race and "Value": Black and White Illegitimate Babies, 1945-1965,
in MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE AND AGENCY 287, 288 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn et. al.
eds., 1994). It was after World War II that white illegitimate babies became desirable for
adoption, giving white mothers more options. Id. at 289-92.
267. Red, 53 S.W. at 618-619.
of a buried infant, the illicit lover of a criminal defendant, and a woman
who may have been abused or threatened by her lover.
2. JONES V. STATE - NEONATICIDE BY A "MAD" MOTHER
The next reported Texas neonaticide occurred in the 1930s, in the case
of Thelma Lee Jones, convicted and sentenced to life in Tyler County for
killing her newborn baby.268 Thelma Lee made a confession, in which she
stated that she had given birth to a baby boy at her grandmother's house,
and had then killed the baby because "I was unable to take care of it."
269
She also said that "[she] did not bury it very deep, because [she] did not
know how. '270 At her trial, she did not testify, but her lawyer raised the
2711issue of her sanity. In reviewing her appeal, the appellate court reversed
and remanded her conviction because of a problem in the indictment, a
failure of evidence to corroborate her confession, and the failure of proof of
her sanity. 272 No reported case shows whether she was subsequently
retried.
Reading between the lines of this case, again there is much we do not
know, such as Thelma Lee's race, marital status, age, and whether she lived
with her grandmother or just delivered the baby at her grandmother's
house. Quite possibly, Thelma Lee killed the infant because it was
illegitimate, and because she was in denial of her pregnancy. As Meyer
and Oberman indicate, neonaticide is "a remarkably widespread
phenomenon," generally "committed in the face of intense emotions such
as shock, shame, guilt and fear" by a teenager who has hidden her
21pregnancy. 2 In this case, the court's opinion does not specularize Thelma
Lee as much as it completely silences her. It is true that she did not testify
herself, but the silencing effect is actually produced by the decision's
failure to summarize the testimony of other witnesses, except the
physician's opinion that the skull fracture would have been sufficient to kill
the baby, the testimony of another woman in her grandmother's house at
the time (it is unclear if the woman, Elizabeth Franklin, was a relation) that
the baby was born alive, and the indication that other defense witnesses
"expressed the opinion that she did not know right from wrong., 274 Since
the appeal did not concern the sufficiency of the evidence, the court had no
legal need to review facts about Thelma Lee's circumstances. The effect,
however, is that her story has been silenced. There is no decision on record
after this one that would add to the facts.
268. Jones v. State, 104 S.W.2d 42, 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1937).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. One of Thelma Lee's attorneys, Clyde E. Smith, later became a justice of the
Texas Supreme Court.
272. Id.
273. MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 151, at 41-44.
274. Jones, 104 S.W.2d at 43.
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Moreover, this decision indicates that of the "mad" or "bad"
dichotomy, Thelma Lee was labeled a "mad" mother, insane at the time she
killed her baby, through testimony "that she did not know right from
wrong.',275 And even though the case was remanded to permit a new trial
and allow proof of her sanity, the decision hints at unexamined
complexities. For example, her confession statements that she was unable
to take care of the baby and she did not know how to dig a deep grave
suggest that she may have been very young or mentally incompetent; and
the fact that none of the other women in the house did anything to save the
baby raises unanswered questions, too.276 The decision's silence leaves
unexplored gaps in her story and thereby encourages our specularizing her
as mad and incompetent.
3. MOFFETT V. STATE - ASSISTANCE OR COERCION FROM A PARTNER
In the 1948 Texas case of Moffett v. State, the court reversed Ruby
Moffett's murder conviction and five-year sentence for the murder of her 3-
year-old daughter born out of wedlock when Ruby was 16.277 The court
determined that the evidence had been insufficient to show that Ruby was a
principal to the murder; rather, the evidence indicated that the man Ruby
lived with, Freddie Kenner, had beaten the child to death while she "may
have stood idly by.,
278
Ruby's written statement described Freddie as her husband, but the
decision silences important facts about their marital status (describing Ruby
and Freddie as "living in the same house") and about whether Freddie was
the child's father (although her statement describes the child as "my
baby"). 27 9 Ruby indicated that she was present when Freddie gave "the
baby [a] severe whipping[ ]," and that he "told [her] several times that [her]
baby would be better off if it were dead. He said the child acted silly.
280
The facts follow the general pattern in the passive category of assistance or
coercion from a partner: a mother younger than 23 (Ruby was 19); greater
risk to the child when the partner is not the father; and death during an
attempt to discipline.281
While the decision labels Ruby a "Negro," and unwed mother, it also
specularizes her as a "bad" mother, due to her failure to turn in Freddie for
275. Although research indicates that "mental illness is unusual in neonaticides," both this
case and Pitts v. State involved mental illness. MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 151, at 43.
276. That none of the women did anything is consistent with the observation that
unwanted pregnancies "might lead both a young woman and those around her to collaborate
in the denial of a pregnancy." MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 15 1, at 57.
277. Moffet v. State, 207 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 1948).
278. Id. at 385.
279. Id. at 384-88.
280. Id. at 385.
281. MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 15 1, at 159-60.
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"brutally beat[ing]" the baby.282 Her conviction, although reversed on
appeal, shows a bias against the mother, an expectation that she should
have been able to prevent the death and a desire to hold her responsible
even if she was not present.283 The decision states: "That appellant failed
to give the alarm and also failed to tell of Kenner's assault upon this
helpless child is evident, and such conduct upon her part, while contrary to
the accepted standard of motherly love, nevertheless... does not...
constitut[e] one a principal. ' '284 Although the outline of Ruby's story might
appear clear to us (Freddie beat the baby and she was afraid to tell the
authorities because he might beat her also), 5 the decision nonetheless
specularizes her as a bad mother in terms that categorically ignore her
circumstances and rely on the universal ideal that good mothers always
protect their children.286 The decision implicitly follows the stereotype that
African-American mothers, especially single mothers, are bad.287  The
decision leaves out what Ashe describes as the "contextualized examination
[which] can often disclose fairly readily the reasons why a mother may not
have intervened to prevent abuse of a child by her boyfriend or husband.
Such an examination may disclose, for example, that the mother was being
abused herself; that she feared further abuse; that she had a history of prior
unsuccessful attempts at intervention; or that she did not fully understand
what was occurring.,
28
4. MARTINEZ V. STATE - MATERNAL NEGLECT
The 1973 appellate court decision relating to the murder conviction of
Irene Martinez, a woman who had killed her 9-month-old daughter,
provides more information than found in earlier cases about the
circumstances surrounding the infanticide. Irene had two young children
on whom she had basically walked out. She moved away from her
apartment in San Antonio to a friend's home and told her friend that her
aunt was going to take care of her children. 289 Her aunt testified that she
and Irene had not made any such arrangements. 290 Five days after Irene
moved out, the children were found locked in the house, and the baby had
282. Moffet, 207 S.W.2d at 385.
283. See MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 151, at 161.
284. Moffet, 207 S.W.2d at 385 (emphasis added).
285. Domestic violence is common in these cases of assistance or coercion from a partner.
MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 151, at 147, 159.
286. "Society generally holds mothers, rather than fathers, responsible for their children's
safety and well-being"; "women are held responsible for their children's deaths, even
though intervention may still result in their own death." MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note
151, at 148, 157-58, 163.
287. See infra, text accompanying note 300.
288. Ashe, supra note 167, at 109.
289. Martinez v. State, 498 S.W.2d 938, 939 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
290. Id.
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died of starvation and dehydration.29'
Irene's ten-year sentence was overturned on appeal because ,her oral
statement to the police officer had not been reduced to writing and was
tainted.292 The decision indicates that on the way to the police station,
Irene told a police officer that her husband was away fighting in the
Vietnam War, that "[she and her husband] did not love each other
anymore," and that the "hundred and thirty dollars a month [her husband
sent] was not enough to feed her children with; that she associated them
with her husband and that she wanted to get rid of them.,
293
Even though Irene testified at trial, the decision silences her story and
specularizes her as a bad mother. For instance, the decision generalizes by
stating, "The record contains much evidence of neglect by appellant of the
children, and of appellant's lack of interest in their welfare. 294 However,
the decision does not recount specific instances of neglect, but rather,
portrays her as a selfish and neglectful mother, a bad mother. Her
conviction was based on the legal theory that she deliberately intended to
cause the baby's death by neglecting to feed the baby.295 The facts recited
in the decision indicate that she moved out of the house to a friend's house
- we don't know if this was a boyfriend or girlfriend.296 She left her
children - one a nine-month-old, the other an unstated age - behind, and
apparently locked the door when she left. She said she'd made
arrangements with her aunt, who would take care of the children, but the
aunt testified that there were no arrangements.297 One of the children died
298
of starvation and dehydration. While the court focuses on these tragic
facts, it objectifies Irene and neglects to reveal her story. For instance, we
do not know her race, whether she was employed, whether she had any
childcare assistance. We don't know whether she was at her wit's end
because she couldn't make it on the $130 a month she received from her
husband.299 We don't know her circumstances but are left with a picture of
a bad mother; whereas patterns in cases of maternal neglect show that
"seemingly loving and caring mothers kill their children through neglect"
because of their "societal disempowerment and exceedingly limited
number of unearned advantages and opportunities."300
291. Id.
292. Id. at 941-42.
293. Id. at 940.
294. Id. at 939.
295. Id. at 942.
296. Id. at 939.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 940. Generally, cases of maternal neglect involve young single mothers who
are poor. See MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 151, at 103, 108-09.
300. Id. at 103.
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5. SUFF V. STATE - ASSISTANCE OR COERCION FROM A PARTNER
In the case of Teryl Rose Suff, both Teryl and her husband William
were convicted for the 1973 murder of their 2-month-old daughter, who
had been severely abused.3°' On appeal, William's conviction was
affirmed, but Teryl's conviction was reversed because there was
insufficient evidence that she had injured the baby.30 2 The facts here reflect
a modem version of the 1948 Moffett case discussed above.
Teryl Suff was married to a violent man who abused their children.
Both the dead baby and an almost 2-year-old son had been previously
abused,30 3 and when a friend asked Teryl whether she was afraid to leave
the children with her husband, she said that "her husband would never do it
intentionally, but only in a fit of temper. ' '304 Ironically, the father was "a
trained paramedic ambulance driver whose specialty was pediatrics. 30 5
Teryl testified that the baby had vomited the night before she died, and also
that when her other son was 3 months old, he was hospitalized for injuries
"resulting from a cradle that rocked., 306
The trial record showed that on the morning the baby died, Teryl fed
her and changed her diaper before she went to work at eight in the
morning.30 7 Then her husband called her around noon to tell her something
had happened to the baby.308 "Teryl ... ran home immediately and went
into hysterics. She broke into [her] next-door [neighbor's] apartment and
called an ambulance., 30 9 The only evidence tending to establish her guilt
was that on the morning of the murder she was not her normal "bright and
talkative self' according to the friend with whom she carpooled.31 °
Although the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed her conviction, the
decision nevertheless specularized Teryl as a bad mother. It explicitly
stated that "we do not doubt that this evidence as well as the entire record
establish[es] that Teryl Suff was, to understate the matter, a poor
mother.' '311  And later, the decision commented, "We cannot bring
ourselves, in spite of the gravity of the offense and the revulsion with which
it fills us, to uphold a verdict supported only by innuendo bolstered by
moral outrage.' '312 The moral outrage is that of patriarchal discourse -
that a baby died; that the mother did not sufficiently protect the two-month-
301. Suffv. State, 531 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
302. Id. at 815, 818.
303. He had "a broken arm and 13 broken ribs in the process of healing." Id. at 816.
304. Id. at 816.
305. Id. at816, n.2.
306. Id. at 816.
307. Id. at 815.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 815-817.
311. Id. at 816 (emphasis added).
312. Id. at 818 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 15:1
old from the baby's father; and that the mother "and her husband went
swimming while the child was in intensive care."3 3
The discourse silences Teryl's story. We know that she fed and
changed the baby before she went to work that morning, and that when she
got home she became hysterical. We don't know her race, her socio-
economic status, her level of education. Nor do we know whether William
also abused Teryl - similar to the case of Ruby Moffett, discussed above.
Aside from the decision's conclusion about her mothering skills, nothing
suggests that she was not a loving and devoted mother whose husband was
extremely abusive. Again, even though the Court of Criminal Appeals
reversed her conviction, the discourse silences, specularizes, and labels her
story. The decision judges Teryl a "poor mother" based on the societal
norm that mothers are responsible for their children's well-being, even if
the mother was not present during the abuse resulting in the child's
death.
3 14
6. HARRINGTON V. STATE - MATERNAL NEGLECT THOUGH OMISSION
In the 1977 case of Harrington v. State, both Denelle and her husband
Gary were tried and convicted for the murder of their 2-year-old daughter
who died of starvation. 31 5  Both convictions and life sentences were
affirmed.316 The case tragically reveals that Denelle and Gary had an older
son, who was taken away by his paternal grandparents when he became
malnourished and suffered a skull fracture.31 7 Although Denelle became
pregnant after this, "she said it was strictly an accident. She said she did
not want another baby and was unhappy about it."'3 8 The baby girl was
apparently kept mainly in her crib, in a room containing "healthy and well
fed" rabbits. 3'9  A neighbor said that although she had never seen
photographs of the baby, she had seen photographs of the pets, and that at
Christmas, the parents "hung Christmas stockings for themselves, their
dog, cat, bird, and rabbit, but they had no stocking or presents for their
baby girl. 32 °
When officers investigated the death, they found the baby in a room
filled with animal and human excrement.32  Neighbors testified thatDenelle didn't like to show the baby, and that she would leave the baby
313. Id. at 816.
314. MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 151, at 158.
315. Harrington v. State, 547 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (Gary); Harrington v.
State, 547 S.W.2d 616 (1977) (Denelle).
316. Harrington, 547 S.W.2d at 621; Harrington, 547 S.W. 2d at 616.
317. Harrington, 547 S.W.2d at 618-19.
318. Id. at619.
319. Id. at 618.
320. Harrington, 547 S.W.2d at 623.
321. Id. at 623.
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alone for eight or nine hours at a time. 322 The day of the baby's death,
Denelle gave the baby "a bottle early in the morning then did not check on
her until 10:30 p.m., at which time the child was dead.
3 23
The decision casts Denelle as a "bad" mother - in part by her own
admission. She gave police a statement that "she was a 'bad mother' and
just did not like small children. 324 Denelle also told a neighbor that "she
was not going to try to feed" the baby because she had rejected food by
spitting it out, and Denelle told her neighbor that "she wasn't going to let it
11325make a monkey - maybe not monkey - but something, out of her...
The ironic specularization the decision gives is that in an apartment full of
well-fed pets, Denelle was worried about being made a "monkey," and
chose rather, to let her baby starve.
The decision labels Denelle a bad mother, and in this instance, it
appears to have been her trial strategy to label herself a bad mother in order
to show that she didn't intentionally kill the baby. While the decision
silences her circumstances - though giving the child's race (white), and
indicating the parents' preference for animals over children - it also
reinscribes patriarchal notions of mothering seen above in the Suff case.
For instance, Denelle's husband claimed that he should not have been tried
as a principal. 6 The father's argument seems to have been that Denelle
was the primary caretaker (even if she was a bad mother), and so, he was
off the hook. The appellate court rejected this argument, reasoning "[e]ven
if appellant's wife normally took care of the child, it would strain logic to
say that he never saw his infant daughter in their two bedroom
apartment. ' ' 27 But, while the court rejected his argument, it placed primary
emphasis on the mother's responsibility and did not similarly label her
husband a "bad father."
7. LOTT V. STATE - ASSISTANCE OR COERCION FROM A PARTNER
In the 1985 Texas case of Eva Lott, the mother's forty-five year
sentence was upheld in another case of maternal neglect by failure to
prevent a boyfriend's abuse of a child.328 In her statement, Eva "denied
that she inflicted any bruises, abrasions, or injuries to the child., 329 The
decision summarizes the evidence as follows:
322. Id. at 618.
323. Harrington, 547 S.W.2d at 618.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 623.
327. Id. at 625.
328. Among the child's many injuries were bums, a stab wound, loose lower teeth, a skull
fracture, and injuries to his scrotum, anus, and rectum. Lott v. State, 686 S.W.2d 304, 306
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985), aff'd, 770 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
329. Lott, 686 S.W.2d at 308.
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[Eva] knew the child was being abused over an extended period of
time, and that it was Barber [her boyfriend] who was beating her
child. However, because she was dependent on the drugs Barber
supplied, she did not leave and did not provide proper medical care
or protection for her child. The record also shows that the facial
injury that resulted in a subdural hematoma was plainly visible,
and that the child's other injuries would be visible to any person
bathing the child. Additionally, there was testimony that the
appellant was at the apartment with the child the day before and on
the day of his death.33°
Eva was convicted of murder for her failure to provide medical care
and protection. 331 The decision silences Eva by omitting such determinable
facts as her race, age (a juvenile perhaps, since she was taken to the
Juvenile Division for questioning),332 or the age of her son, Tommy.
Beyond that, it provides no information about her experiences and
motivations - other than that she was drug-dependant.
While the circumstances parallel most cases in the passive category of
assistance from a partner by consisting of mothers who are involved with
abusive, violent male partners unrelated to the child, and who live in
poverty,333 the facts of Tommy's abuse and death were so horrible as to
forestall much sympathy from the court about Eva's circumstances (other
than her drug addiction) that resulted in her son's death. Thus, the court
silenced her story and specularized her as a bad mother, premising its
judgment on the assumption discussed above in the Suff and Harrington
cases, that a mother has primary responsibility for her child's safety and
well-being, and that she may be held responsible for the child's death even
330. Id. at 309.
331. Id. at 305. In a case decided several years later, Patterson v. State, 46 S.W.3d 294,
299 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 2001), the mother's conviction of injury to a child by omission
was reversed; the court rendered judgment for the lesser included offense of reckless injury
to a child by omission, resulting in serious bodily injury. Schwana Patterson's live-in
boyfriend had abused her 11-year-old daughter, then kidnapped and murdered her daughter
and attempted to murder her 9-year-old son. Id. at 298-99. Schwana's conviction was
reversed because the court held that there was insufficient evidence that Schwana "knew
with reasonable certainty that intervention during the kidnapping would have prevented the
children's injuries." Id. at 303. On retrial to determine punishment, Patterson was
sentenced to eight years' confinement. Patterson v. State, 101 S.W.3d 150 (Tex. App.-Ft.
Worth 2003). In an interview after her first trial, she stated, "I can honestly say in some
ways I blame myself... In hindsight, I ask myself if there was anything I could have done.
I feel responsible because I'm the one who got involved with Bobby Woods. I'm the one
who brought him into the home." Bill Hanna, Mother Relives Child's Slaying, FT. WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Oct. 29, 1998, at 1A, available at 1998 WL 14934916. The boyfriend
was subsequently convicted of attempted capital murder and sentenced to life in prison.
Woods v. State, 14 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 2000).
332. Lott, 686 S.W.2d at 306.
333. MEYER& OBERMAN, supra note 151, at 159.
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if the mother was absent or if "intervention may result in [the mother's]
own death., 334 This view is reflected in the statement by a Tarrant County
prosecutor regarding a later case of injury to a child by omission:
They'll say that they were in fear, that they couldn't do anything to
stop it ... But part of it is that [their] relationship with that man is
more important than their child. I think they see their kids as an
inconvenience. They'll be all excited when they're pregnant and
getting attention, but when that child is born and starts cramping
their lifestyle ... then that child becomes an inconvenience.335
Such views illustrate the dominant and patriarchal discourse which
specularizes and labels women involved with abusive partners who kill
their children. In contrast, Eva's specularization is rejected by the dissent
to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decision affirming Eva's judgment.
Judge Teague's dissent stated:
A[n] unemotional mother in Russia might be liable to a full
custodial warrantless arrest merely because she has been told her
child is dead and makes no outcry, but in this state no unemotional
mother should ever be liable to a full custodial warrantless arrest
without more than the fact that she acknowledges that she is the
mother of a child that has been declared dead and in response
336thereto fails to show any emotion.
As the majority of these decisions demonstrate, however, legal
discourse more typically than not specularizes mothers who kill their
children. Justice Teague's dissent provides the exception.
8. PITTS V. STATE - PURPOSEFUL KILLING
Leanne Marie Pitts's conviction and sixty-three year sentence for the
1985 murder of her 8-day-old son was initially reversed by the Houston
Court of Appeals, but then affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals.337 Although the decisions suppress her story and label her a mad
mother, the decisions can be contrasted with media accounts, which reveal
334. Id. at 163.
335. Selwyn Crawford, Expert Says Illness Impairs Moms Who Kill, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, June 9, 1997, at 17A, available at 1997 WL 2676214, (quoting David Montague's
remarks about Schwana Patterson). Montague was also quoted as commenting about
another case, "We're in trial for the death of their [Jay and Linda Hill] 12-year-old son, and
all they can do is make goo-goo eyes at each other." Id.
336. Quoted in R. G. Ratcliffe, Split Court Upholds Lott Conviction, Hous. CHRON., Nov.
20, 1986, at 1A, available at 1986 WL 5129653.
337. Pitts v. State, 712 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986), rev'd, 758
S.W.2d 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc).
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more of her story.
The judicial decisions provide bare details about Leanne's
circumstances. She became pregnant when she was 19, married the baby's
father, but then, because of "marital difficulties... returned to live with her
parents. 338 Eight days after her son was born, "she waited until her parents
had left the house. She then took the child into the kitchen, sat on the floor,
and placed her hand over Michael's mouth and nose until he was dead. 339
The testimony was in "dispute [about] whether she then attempted to shoot
herself with her father's gun.,,340 After she suffocated the infant, she called
the constable. 34' At trial, the state produced evidence that she had laughed
in telling another prisoner how she killed her son.342
Since her attorney "did not file notice of a defense of not guilty by
reason of insanity ten days prior to the beginning of the trial as required by
law,, 343 information about her mental state is largely excluded from the
legal decisions. However, as the media reports below indicate, Leanne, and
likely her parents, believed she was insane at the time. The decision of the
court of appeals includes her psychologist's testimony that Leanne was
suffering from a "brief reactive psychosis," due to her "intense stress
brought about by her pregnancy, her relationships with her husband and
family, the delivery of the child, and feelings of depression and lack of
control over her life.",344 The psychologist testified that in killing the baby,
Leanne "perceive[ed] the child to be, not an independent human being, but
an extension of herself and subject to her will to commit suicide. 3 45
The judicial decisions obscure Leanne's life story by giving minimal
details of a teenage pregnancy and bad marriage. The media articles
provide more information. For instance, one article transcribes her
conversation with the constable's office as follows:
"I've killed my baby."
"You what?" clerk Connie Greiner asked.
"I've killed my baby."
... "How did you kill your baby?"
338. Pitts, 712 S.W.2d at 564.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Christy Drennan, Mom's Plea for Aid Before Killing Was Rejected, Witness Says,
Hous. CHRON., Aug. 8, 1985, at IA, available at 1985 WL 3671054.
344. Pitts, 712 S.W.2d at 565.
345. Id. at 566. The court of appeals rejected her contention that the trial court improperly
excluded this testimony during the guilt state of trial because it was "not offered to establish
insanity," and held that it was admissible only during the punishment stage. Id.
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Pitts: "I suffocated him."
Greiner: "Was he crying a lot?"
Pitts: "No. I've got mental problems."
346
The news articles flesh out these "mental problems." Specifically,
when she was eight-and-a-half-months pregnant she was out of control and
talking about killing herself, so she contacted Mental Health/Mental
Retardation (MHMR); however, MHMR did not admit her, but referred her
to another agency.347 Her father testified that during this time, she was very
depressed and that, "She was in a very bad condition, crying, sobbing,
acting like she didn't have any control over herself.
348
Ten years after her conviction, Leanne gave another interview from
prison in which she described her actions as driven by madness.349 She
said,
"I told Michael it was time to go home .... I made sure that his
clothes were on right, and I sat down with him, and I held him. I
held him on my lap just like you would bounce a child on your
knee. I had no idea what it was going to be like, what it was going
to look like .... I held my hand, I held .... I held him with both
of my hands, and I just held him like I was hugging him, and I
just... I cried. I said it's time to go home, and then he didn't
move any more.,
350
In her 1995 interview she described the postpartum
depression/psychosis as a "constant[ ] ... dark presence, .... like a flock of
birds moving, shifting,' and she felt like she could not get clean., 351 Her
view of the baby was that he was "an extension of herself: 'I don't think I
ever really saw him as a separate human. I have some memories of holding
him, feeling a lot of love for him, but they were very brief. It was like he
was a corpse. It was like I was with a corpse already. He was like a part of
me that had already died."' 3
52
The news articles give other details of her life that might have
accounted for her mental instability. For instance, in her interview ten
years after her trial, she said that she had met her husband Tracy Pitts when
she was 17, and when she moved in with him, "It was a druggie lifestyle,"
346. Christy Drennan, "I've Killed My Baby, "' Jurors Hear on Recording of Phone Call,
Hous. CHRON., Aug. 7, 1985, at IA, available at 1985 WL 3670994.
347. Drennan, supra note 343.
348. Id.
349. T.J. Milling, Science Seeks Roots of Infanticide, Woman Recounts Killing Her 8-Day-
Old Son, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 15, 1995, at 37A, available at 1995 WL 9409135.
350. Id.
351. Milling. supra note 349.
352. Id.
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of which "[h]er parents did not approve." 353 At her trial, her parents
testified about "the heartbreak and shame they felt from having their
daughter pregnant and unmarried. 354 Her mother did not approve of her
relationship and "implored [her] not to date" him, and had "told her if she
wanted to go she could, but don't come back home. 355 When Leanne
became pregnant, her mother urged her to get an abortion, and when
Leanne rejected that idea, her mother urged her to give the baby up for
356adoption. Although Leanne agreed to give up the baby, she changed her
mind after he was born. However, after she returned to her parents' home,
she felt she was too much of a burden on her parents and decided to kill
both her baby and herself.357
While Leanne's story contains characteristics listed in the "purposeful
killing" category, in most respects it is more aligned with the neonaticide
category. It is consistent with the purposeful category in that more than
half involved attempted or successful suicide by the mother.358 Also, most
mothers, while not legally insane, "suffer[ed] from disorders such as
depression, anxiety, and psychosis., 35 9 Unlike most purposeful killers,
however, Leanne was not known as a devoted and loving mother, and there
were not multiple deaths.360 Rather, as in most neonaticides, Leanne had
been in denial about her pregnancy, and after the baby was born, had felt
shame about her situation.36 Moreover, mental illness, such as Leanne's,
is also common in neonaticides.362  Further, mothers who commit
neonaticide generally do not act with premeditation, "but rather act ... in
the face of intense emotion such as shock, shame, guilt, and fear."
363
Thus, although a combination of the judicial decisions and media
accounts provide enough information to consider Leanne's act in light of
the characteristic patterns of neonaticide, and to view her act with "other
love," the judicial system failed to show compassion in imposing a sixty-
three-year sentence. The decisions and media reports specularize her as
"mad" although it is unlikely she was "mad" enough to have been able to
prove she was insane, and the court excluded psychiatric evidence as
"irrelevant to the issue of guilt."
364
353. Id.
354. Drennan, supra note 346.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 151, at 86, 93.
359. Id. at 93.
360. Id. at 86, 89.
361. Id. at43.
362. Id. at 55 (Thirty percent had a preexisting mental illness.)
363. Id. at 43.
364. Pitts, 712 S.W.2d at 565-66 (excluded psychiatric testimony of a "brief reactive
psychosis" in which she was "under intense stress brought about by her pregnancy, her
relationships with her husband and family, the delivery of the child, and feelings of
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9. JUANA LEIJA- PURPOSEFUL KILLING
Juana Leija received ten years probation when she pleaded no contest
to charges of murder and attempted murder arising out of the 1986
drowning deaths of two of her seven children. News articles describing the
event report that Juana endured a pathetic existence and that many,
including the judge, placed primary responsibility upon her husband, Jose,
who for years had physically, emotionally, and sexually abused her.365
Although there is no judicial decision reviewing Juana's case, the media
reports provide much information about the circumstances that resulted in
the infanticides. Thus, unlike most other Texas infanticides, we can view
Juana's story with something approaching "other love."
When Juana was 14 years old, she felt she had to marry Jose after he
366
raped her and threatened to ruin her reputation. They moved from
Mexico to Houston, and Jose began beating Juana soon after the birth of
their first child, Esther, who was mildly retarded; unfortunately, the
violence escalated over the years.367 Neighbors warned that they would
call the police on more than one occasion when Jose threatened Juana in
the street with a pistol and beat her in public.368 During this time Jose
continued to force himself on Juana, and she bore seven children as a
result.369 Juana later said that the abuse made her want to die, but she kept
going because she loved her children. 370  At times she disappeared and
didn't know where she was. 371 Her husband filed a missing person's report
on her at least once.372 When she finally tried to leave her husband, the
Salvation Army evicted her after a week because her children were causing
problems.373 Juana said in an interview that when she could not obtain help
from friends or family she lost hope and saw "no way out. '374 She decided
that her best option was to kill herself and her children with an overdose of
sleeping pills so that none of them would suffer any longer, but she was
depression and lack of control over her life"; moreover, she "perceive[ed] the child to be,
not an independent human being, but an extension of herself and subject to her will to
commit suicide").
365. John Makeig, Juana Leija Pleads No Contest, Gets JO-Year Probation, Hous.
CHRON., June 18, 1987, at 1, available at 1987 WL 5654322; Lori Rodriguez, Juana Leia
Gets 10 Years Probation, 'I Never Wanted to Marry Jose Luis,' Hous. CHRON., June 19,
1987, at 1, available at 1987 WL 5654550.
366. Maureen Balleza, ' Don't Feel Culpable,'Jose Leija Says, Hous. CHRON., June 20,
1987, at 1, available at 1987 WL 5654675.
367. Rodriguez, supra note 365.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Rosanna Ruiz, Woman Who Threw Children in Bayou is Mending Her Life, Hous.
CHRON., July 4, 2001, at 29A.
371. Susan Warren & Rad Sallee, 'Why Didn't We All Die?' Asks Mother When Told
Child Dead, Hous. CHRON., April 20, 1986, at 1, available at 1986 WL 5088096.
372. Id.
373. Rodriguez, supra note 365.
374. Id.
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unable to carry out this plan, and was also unsuccessful in her attempt to
hang herself.
375
Overcome with despair from food deprivation and beatings, Juana, who
was 29, told her 9-year-old daughter, Eloisa, of her plan to drown the
children, and enlisted her help in calming her siblings.376 With all seven of
her children, she boarded a bus to Buffalo Bayou in downtown Houston.377
Her 5-year-old (also named Juana) jumped into the deep water after being
378scolded for throwing the baby's shoes into the water. Juana (the mother)
then heard voices telling her to throw all of the children in the water.379
She threw in 1-year-old Elvira, then 6-year-old Judas, 4-year-old
Esperanza, and 3-year-old Rosa.38° When she tried to throw in Eloisa,
Eloisa was able to escape to the police station across the street.
381
Bystanders heard the children and were able to rescue four of them, but
Juana and Judas died despite the rescue efforts.382
Juana told police that she chased Eloisa to the police station because
her plan had fallen apart and she wanted police help.383 In her statement
that day she said, "I wanted to end my life and the lives of my children
because I knew that sooner or later my husband was going to kill me, and I
didn't want my children to stay with him or someone else that was going to
mistreat them., 384 She felt that her children were better off dead than living
with their abusive father.385
As in other characteristic purposeful killings, there was a strong bond
between Juana and her children, which even the assistant district attorney
acknowledged.386 Also as in other characteristic purposeful killings,
multiple children were involved, the mother had mental problems,
387attempted suicide, and was an immigrant.
Media reports did not specularize Juana as "bad," nor as merely "mad."
Rather than suppress her story, the reports - especially the interview
fifteen years later - tell of both her madness and of her abusive husband.
Thus, the reports provide information that allows us to approach the
infanticides with "other love." The reports and the judge's evaluation of
her case cast her decision to throw her children into the bayou as a
375. Id.; Ruiz, supra note 370.
376. John Makeig, Juana Leiia Gets 10 Years Probation, Documents Show Tragic Family
Life, Hous. CHRON., June 19, 1987, at 1, available at 1987 WL 5654551.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.; Warren & Sallee, supra note 371.
381. Makeig, supra note 376.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. See MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 151, at 86-93.
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mothering decision based on desperation and love.388 Juana told a reporter
in 2001 that she had finally been able to forgive herself for throwing her
389
children in Buffalo Bayou in 1987. She had divorced her husband a year
after the drownings, and has maintained contact with her two oldest
daughters and grandchildren.3 9° Juana said that mental illness (she is
bipolar) and her husband's abuse caused her to commit the crime.391
However, she emphasized that she loved her children and tried to end their
lives because she didn't want to leave them with her husband after she
killed herself.392 Juana pleaded that she and mothers like Andrea Yates
deserve compassion: "I just pray they may understand that when a mother
does this kind of stuff it is not because we don't love our children."
393
10. SCOTT V. STATE - PURPOSEFUL KILLING
In the 1987 Texas case of Brenda Ann Scott's murder of her 2-year-old
son, the decision silences her story and labels her a bad mother.394
Brenda's 25 year sentence was reversed by the Dallas Court of Appeals in
an unpublished decision, but later affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals in an interesting decision about the corpus delicti.395
The tale began when Brenda's neighbor found her sitting and crying
outside her burning apartment with her oldest child.396 The neighbor was
unable to rescue Brenda's 2-year-old son Russell due to the wildly burning
fire in the child's room.397 The Fire Department found the child's charred
body in his crib; an investigation found that the fire burned most intensely
near the crib, and that the fire could not have been accidental. 398 When the
medical examiner's report concluded that the baby most likely died before
388. Heinzelman provides information about the strategies used by Juana's defense
attorney, Dick De Guerin, one of the most prominent defense attorneys in Texas, who took
her case at the request of prominent Hispanic leaders in Houston. See Heinzelman, supra
note 170, at 94. De Guerin "situated [her] particular tragedy within a larger cultural
narrative through the figure of La Llorona," a Mexican mythic figure who is ghostly and
associated with murder of her children due to "sexual and familial betrayal." Id. at 95.
While De Guerin's narrative incorporating La Llorona was not reported by the media, the
media reports discussed above pieced together a complex narrative which allowed her story
to be listened to with "other love."
389. Ruiz, supra note 370.
390. Id. The younger surviving children were later adopted. Even today, Eloisa continues
to blame her mother for many of her problems; "Sometimes she thinks I don't love her." Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Scott v. State, 732 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc).
395. On remand, the Dallas Court of Appeals found the evidence sufficient and affirmed.
Scott v. State, No. 05-84-00109-CR (Tex. App.-Dallas (5th Dist.) Aug. 31, 1987),
available at http://www.5thcoa.courts.state.tx.us/cgi-
bin/asweb.exe?c05 89.ask+D+20824382.
396. Scott, 732 S.W.2d at 354.
397. Id. at 355.
398. Id.
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the fire and had suffered multiple bone fractures, Brenda was charged with
beating her child with her fists and killing him, 399 then setting his crib on
fire to conceal the evidence. 0
Descriptions of Brenda in both cases are confined to evaluations of her
relationship with her children and her husband. Many people were
suspicious and critical of her. The apartment manager reported that Brenda
401frequently screamed profanities at her younger, and now deceased son.
Babysitters reported that Brenda had mentally and physically abused her
402younger son.4 2 Brenda's friend, Mrs. Parks, told the court that Brenda was
"distant" and that she often screamed at her younger child.40 3 Mrs. Parks
further testified that Brenda frequently told her younger son that he would
make her kill him. 40 4 One babysitter stated that that Brenda treated her
younger child differently from her older child, and reported that on one hot
Dallas day Brenda locked her younger son in the car for nearly an hour. 5
Both Parks and the babysitter had contacted Child Protective Services. The
CPS social worker's report revealed only that Brenda did not interact with
her younger son and that he was withdrawn and had some scars and
bruises.40 6
Brenda's husband was allegedly violent and abusive towards her, but
usually not towards the children.40 7 The court of appeals found on remand
that because the husband was at work at the time of the fire, and that any
physical injury of the child by him had involved only possible slapping or
shoving, he was not likely involved in the murder.408 The court implicitly
concluded that Brenda's history of belligerence and violence toward her
son made her more likely to have caused the death. Thus it reduced her
reality to that of a "bad mother" and ignored the impact her husband's
abuse had upon her. Although some facts, such as Brenda's lack of
devotion towards Russell,409 indicate differences from characteristic
patterns of purposeful killings, other facts indicate that she was living in a
highly stressful domestic violence situation. Her sister, mother, and sister-
in-law testified that her husband was a violent alcoholic who abused
399. Court Overturns Mother's Murder Conviction in Son's Death, DALLAS MORN. NEWS,
Jan. 25, 1986, at 37A, available at 1986 WL 4303599.
400. Scott, 732 S.W.2d at 357. About 37% of purposeful killing involve death by fire, or
setting fire after causing death. MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 151, at 87.
401. Scott, 732 S.W.2d at 355.
402. Scott, No. 05-84-00109-CR, at http://www.5thcoa.courts.state.tx.us/cgi-
bin/as web.exe?c05 89.ask+D+20824382.
403. Scott, 732 S.W.2d at 355.
404. Id. at 356.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Scott, No. 05-84-00109-CR, at http://www.5thcoa.courts.state.tx.us/cgi-
bin/asweb.exe?c05_89.ask+D+20824382.
408. Id.
409. MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 151, at 89.
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410Brenda and the children. It is not being argued here that Brenda was
without blame, but rather that the judicial discourse constructed her as a
"bad mother" and, like most courts deciding such cases, silenced her story.
11. KIMBERLY LYNETTE HARRIS - PURPOSEFUL KILLING
In Harris v. State, Texas' Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction of Kimberly Harris, who had received a fifty-year sentence for
the 1993 death of her 23 month old daughter, Brittany.411 On the night of
the murder, Kimberly, then 23, told her own mother that she was going to
the store alone.412 Upon her return, Kimberly and her mother reported
Kimberly's child missing.1 3 Police officers involved with the search were
suspicious of Kimberly's "unnatural calmness. ' 414  Two days later
Kimberly took her boyfriend to Brays Bayou where she wondered out loud
"What if she were in the bayou?" and after police discovered Brittany's
blanket, a police helicopter found the child's body a half-mile away.415
Police reported that Kimberly behaved as if she was crying violently, but
she produced no tears.416 Initially Kimberly implicated a taxi cab driver
named "Obie," but she later changed her statement and confessed that she
417had abandoned the toddler at the bayou where the child had drowned.
Kimberly told police she "just wanted her to have a better life.' ' 8
At trial, Kimberly raised the insanity defense. Her attorneys reportedly
told jurors that it was obvious that a mother "who would do [this] must be
crazy., 419 Likewise, Kimberly's mother testified that Kimberly loved her
daughter "more than life itself' and that if Kimberly had caused the death
she must have been "stone crazy. ' 420  Defense experts testified that
Kimberly was psychotic at the relevant time,42 1 and that she was
profoundly depressed due to a recent abortion, rejection by her daughter's
422father, and money problems. Moreover, Kimberly had a borderline I.Q.
of fifty-seven. 423  However, the jury rejected her insanity defense. The
prosecution's expert stated that it was possible that Kimberly was psychotic
at the time of the offense, but that she might be lying, and her confession to
410. Scott, 732 S.W.2d at 354, 357.
411. Harris v. State, No. 14-94-01127-CR, available at 1997 WL 445803, at *10 (Tex.
App.-Houston (1 st Dist.) Aug. 7, 1997) (not designated for publication).
412. Id. at*1.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Jennifer Liebrum, Mom Killed Baby Daughter, Jury Says, HoUs. CHRON., Aug. 25,
1994, at 21 A, available at 1994 WL 4211122.
419. Id.
420. Harris, 1997 WL 445803, at *3.
421. Id.
422. Liebrum, supra note 418.
423. Id.
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424
the police indicated that she acted with knowledge of right and wrong.
The defense experts also agreed that their evaluations would have been
different if she had lied to them about her ability to remember the
incident.425
The judicial discourse and media accounts cast Kimberly as a "mad or
bad" mother based on her dishonesty and on her selfishness in sacrificing
her daughter to clear the way for a renewed relationship with the child's
father, who had spurned her.426 Even the judge who imposed the fifty-year
prison sentence labeled her as a bad mother when he told her, "there can be
no justice in this case. 427 Similarly, one of her friends in acknowledging
Kimberly's troubles said, "Don't matter.., nothing so bad it would excuse
this. 428  Thus, even the friend we might expect to be sympathetic to
Kimberly's circumstances labeled her a "bad mother." Media and legal
discourse completely failed to view her story with other love.
12. MARCIE MOON - NEONATICIDE
Marcie Moon was convicted for the capital murder of her newborn
daughter in 1994, and sentenced to life in prison. 429 Both the media and
court decision silence her story by offering little detail concerning the facts
of the case other than to state how she suffocated her daughter.43 °
Moreover, news articles specularize her as a bad mother by describing the
infanticide as an attempt to save her relationship with her husband.431
Unlike most other mothers who commit neonaticide, Marcie was not a
432teenager, but was 25. She and her husband had had another child
together, but at the time they were separated and Marcie hoped they could
reconcile, although her husband later testified that "their marriage was
tumultuous... [and] that he did not trust his wife and that she was not a
good mother. '433 As is typical of other neonaticides, Marcie was in denial
of her pregnancy because it was not her husband's child and that
circumstance had apparently thwarted reconciliation attempts.434 Although
she had considered adoption and abortion, she pursued neither alternative,
424. Harris, 1997 WL 445803, at *4.
425. Id.
426. Liebrum, supra note 418; Jennifer Liebrum, Mother, 25 Sentenced to 50 Years,
Claimed Insanity in Toddler's Death, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 30, 1994, at 14A, available at
1994 WL 4203070.
427. Liebrum, supra note 418.
428. S.K. Bardwell, Mother of Girl Charged with Murder, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 16, 1993,
at 25A, available at 1993 WL 9547639.
429. Moon v. State, No. 01-95-01265-CR, available at 1997 WL 403115, at * 1 (Tex.
App. - Houston (14th Dist.) July 17, 1997) (not designated for publication).
430. Id. at *2.
431. Jennifer Liebrum, Mother's Tale: Kill Her Baby or Lose Mate, Hous. CHRON., Oct.
6, 1995, at 34A, available at 1995 WL 9407639.
432. Meyer & Oberman, supra note 151, at 43.
433. Liebrum, supra note 431.
434. Id.
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but delivered the baby and then smothered it in her apartment bathroom.435
At the trial Marcie testified that she had to choose between her husband
and her child, and that she desperately desired to reconcile with him.436
Marcie described cradling the baby and smothering it under towels shortly
after birth because she "freaked" and "wanted him [the husband] back sobad. , ,A37
Like many other neonaticides, Marcie's story has been silenced, and
she has been labeled a "bad" mother, who made a bad "choice" of killing
her baby over her husband.438 Tried for capital murder, she was found
guilty and given a life sentence. 439 Neither the judicial decision affirming
the judgment nor the news article provides much more than the bare details
of Marcie's story.
13. DIANA LUMBRERA - PURPOSEFUL KILLING
Five of Diana Lumbrera's children and a niece died while in her care
between 1975 and 1984 in the small panhandle town of Bovina, Texas.440
As each child died, Diana "cried and often fainted with grief."441 She was
considered a devoted mother,442 and neighbors and relatives said only that
they could not imagine that she would ever hurt her children.443 When
doctors ruled the deaths natural, Texas law enforcement officials initially
ignored the series of deaths. 4 4  However, when Diana moved to Kansas
and was convicted in Kansas in 1992 for smothering her sixth child, the
Texas cases were reopened.445 The 1995 Kansas case, State v. Lumbrera,
was Diana's second appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court. Between the
first and second Kansas trials she pled nolo contendere to two murders in
Texas." 7 Diana received two life sentences for the deaths of two of her
children in Texas (the rest of the charges were dropped)." 8  Kansas
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id
438. Id.
439. Moon, 1997 WL 403115, at *1.
440. Roy Bragg, PANHANDLE MYSTERY, Mom's Frightening Legacy: 6 Children and 6
Tiny Caskets, Hous. CHRON., May 13, 1990, at 1, available at 1990 WL 2983185; Chip
Brown, Family, Friends Defend Mother Accused of Killing Six Children, Hous. CHRON.,
Dec. 13, 1900, at 4, available at 1990 WL 2978919.
441. Brown, supra note 440.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Bragg, supra note 440. Originally medical records listed the causes of death of the
children as strangulation due to asphyxiation, choking, acute congenital heart disease, and
blood poisoning.
445. State v. Lumbrera, 845 P.2d 609 (Kan. 1992); With Latest Charge, Mom Now Linked
to Deaths of 5 Children, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 22, 1991, at 16A, available at 1991 WL
3898780.
446. State v. Lumbrera, 891 P.2d 1096 (Kan. 1995).
447. Lumbrera, 891 P.2d at 1102.
448. Mother Serving Life in Texas Convicted of Smothering Son, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 25,
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prosecutors used these Texas convictions as well as testimony by experts
involved in the Texas cases in the new Kansas trial. 449 The evidence
supported the theory that the children had died from asphyxiation probably
450due to suffocation.
Little is known about Diana. She dropped out of school in the seventh
grade and was married twice.45  Although Diana did not contest her
convictions in the Texas cases, she claimed the children had been killed by
a curse. 452  A friend of Diana's told reporters that Diana believed in
"brujas," a type of Hispanic witch who can place spells or curses on
people.453 Diana told her friend that Diana's mother-in-law had put a curse
on her that had damned all of her children to death.454 Evidence indicated,
however, that she smothered each of her children, probably for the purpose
of obtaining life insurance benefits.455 Media accounts summarize trial
testimony regarding her financial difficulties,456 including various lies she
fabricated to loan officers, such as her need for money in order to pay for
her son's leukemia treatments.457 Her defense attorney stated in his closing
argument that "In a way, we are driven to a modern-day version of a witch
hunt.... It's comforting to believe we've found a monster in our midst.
It's much harder to face the fact our children are fragile and they die and
we can't accept it.
' 458
While the legal discourse in the Kansas decisions uses more neutral
language than earlier cases, the Kansas decisions continue to specularize
and silence the mother's story. For example, the second Kansas appellate
decision states that "the concept that a mother would intentionally kill her
own young child is so repugnant that such a theory places a heavy burden
on the state., 459 This view ignores Diana's reality and dismisses facts
about her personal life and financial circumstances that might have allowed
us to view her infanticides with "other love." Rather, the discourse
supports the conclusion alluded to by her own attorney that Diana was "a
monster."
1993, at 1A, available at 1993 WL 9549483.
449. Lumbrera, 891 P.2d at 1102-03.
450. Id. at 1104.
451. Bragg, supra note 440.
452. Brown, supra note 440.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Lumbrera, 891 P.2d at 1103.
456. Roy Bragg, Mom Convicted in Son's Death, Jury Rules Lumbrera Killed Boy to Get
$5,000 Insurance, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 3, 1990, at IA, available at 1990 WL 6619793.
457. Roy Bragg, Witnesses: Alleged Child-Killer Lumbrera Fabricated Tragic Tale,
Hous. CHRON., Sept. 27, 1990, at 36A, available at 1990 WL 2966628.
458. Bragg, supra note 456.
459. Lumbrera, 891 P.2d at 1103.
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14. FRANCES NEWTON - PURPOSEFUL KILLING
In an unpublished opinion, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed Frances Newton's capital murder conviction. 460 Frances, whose
death penalty is pending for the 1987 fatal shooting of her husband, Adrian,
and two children, Alton (7 years old) and Farah (21 months old) was
described by reporters as "soft spoken" and "like a choir member.
'A61
Frances, who was 22, married Adrian when she was only 14, and her
462
marriage suffered from her husband's adultery and drug involvement.
She admitted that after catching him in bed with a woman the previous year
she might have said she would kill him if she found out he was cheating
463
again. However she denied knowing about her husband's most recent
infidelity, and stated that she had reconciled with her husband on the day of
the murders, and had agreed on that day to end her own two-month-long
464affair with Jeffrey Frelow.
Nevertheless, her conviction was upheld on review of the sufficiency
of the evidence. Trial testimony by the brother and mistress of the husband
placed Frances at the scene of the crime minutes before it occurred.46 5
Moreover, an insurance agent told the court that Frances had purchased
$100,000 in life insurance on her husband and daughter three weeks prior
466to the murders. In addition, Jeffrey Frelow testified that he began an
affair with Frances two months before the murders, that the murder weapon
belonged to his cousin, and that Frances had had access to the gun in his
apartment.46' A ballistics expert established that the gun Frances had
abandoned was the murder weapon, and an expert for the State testified that
nitrites found on the dress Frances claimed to have worn that night were
likely from gunpowder residue.468
Frances was at the time of her sentencing in 1992 the only Texas
mother guilty of infanticide sentenced to execution by lethal injection.469
After Frances's conviction, Darlie Routier was also sentenced to death by
lethal injection. Even though Frances testified (and provided an alternative
version of events that occurred on the evening of the murders), the decision
frames her as cold-blooded bad mother: "A more cold-blooded, calculated
460. Newton v. State, No. 70770, 1992 WL 175742 (Tex. Crim. App. Jun. 17, 1992) (not
designated for publication).
461. John Makeig, Wife Admits Hiding Gun, Denies Killing Mate, Two Children, Hous.
CHRON., Oct. 22, 1988, at 26A, available at 1988 WL 6351042; see also John Makeig, Jury
Gives Newton Death in Slayings of Her Family, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 26, 1988, at 17A,
available at WL 6328689.
462. Id.
463. Newton, 1992 WL 175742, at * 3.
464. Id. at *3.
465. Id. at *1-*2.
466. Id. at *2.
467. Id. at *1.
468. Id. at *2.
469. Makeig, Jury Gives Newton Death in Slayings of Her Family, supra note 461.
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act of violence is difficult to imagine. 47°
Media accounts provide some pieces of Frances's story unmentioned
by the judicial opinion. For instance, Francis married and had a child when
she was 14. Maternal age at the time of birth is a high risk factor for
infanticide4 1 and psychologists recognize that having children at such a
young age prevents young women from developing a strong sense of
self.4 72 Moreover other stresses included her husband's affairs throughout
their marriage and his cocaine abuse. 473  However, neither the judicial
decision nor the media reports describe her relationship with her children.
Nor do they indicate whether Frances suffered any emotional distress as a
result of her husband's multiple affairs and cocaine addiction. Apparently,
several months before the murders, she began an affair with her old
boyfriend, and several weeks before the killings, took out life insurance
policies on her family. However, we don't know what ultimately caused
her to murder her children. The judicial decision and media reports prevent
us from viewing Frances's acts with "other love," from "understand[ing]
her acts as a response to the societal construction of and constraints upon
mothering. 47 4
15. CLAUDETrE KIBBLE - PURPOSEFUL KILLING
After each of three children died, Claudette Kibble, who was 14 when
her first child died, claimed the child died of a seizure.475 Upon the death
of her third child prosecutors tried to charge her, but the coroner was
unable to provide a medical explanation for the deaths.476 However,
officials realized that the children's seizure disorders were based purely on
Claudette's own reports, and Child Protective Services ("CPS") therefore
began documenting her fifth child's health when he was born.477 In 1994
when her fifth child was hospitalized because he quit breathing, CPS
478investigated. Finally, Claudette's mother turned her in when she
470. Newton, 1992 WL 175742, at *17. A defense attorney stated, "The dead kids got us
the penalty. The jury felt killing them was inexcusable." The prosecution had offered her a
life sentence for a guilty plea, but "she wouldn't have pled for her life or 20 years or
anything. She wouldn't have said she killed her children for even 10 days in County Jail."
Makeig, Jury Gives Newton Death in Slayings of Her Family, supra note 461.
471. Overpeck, supra note 7, at 24-25.
472. MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 151, at 104.
473. Makeig, Jury Gives Newton Death in Slayings of Her Family, supra note 461..
474. MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 151, at 13.
475. Jennifer Liebrum, Mom's Plea to Killing Two of Her Kids: Guilty, Another Child
Recovered from Injuries, HOus. CHRON., May 7, 1996, at 22A, available at 1996 WL
5597022.
476. Stephanie Asin, Kid's Death Get Mother 3 Life Terms, Woman Covered Up Crimes
for Nine Years, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 15, 1997, at 19A, available at 1997 WL 6535024.
477. Id.
478, S.K. Bardwell, Mom Admits Killing 3 Children, Confession Confirms Suspicions of
Authorities, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 22, 1995, at IA, available at 1995 WL 9405270.
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confessed to the murders in 1995, nine years after the first child died.479
Although she was not charged for the murder of her first child, because she
was too young to be tried as an adult when she committed the crime,48° she
was charged for the others. She pled guilty and received three consecutive
life sentences for murdering two of her five children and attempting to
murder a third.481
Claudette told police she had not meant to do it when she drowned her
first child in 1986 and her second in 1988. 481 She suffocated her third child
in 1990 and tried to kill her fourth in 1994.483 One child, a 7-year old
daughter, was never harmed and the other surviving son, Wright, was taken
into Child Protective Services custody.484
Most of Claudette's vague history comes from statements by her
defense attorney that when she was 13 she was kidnapped and raped, that
she had an I.Q. of ninety-two, and that she had psychological problems and
heard voices that motivated her to kill her children.485 Her mother has
remained silent about factors in Claudette's life. Although Claudette
"mentioned some things" that may have motivated her, the police
department refused to detail her confession.486 Since Claudette pled guilty,
we cannot learn more about Claudette's circumstances from reading a
judicial decision. We cannot view her murders with "other love" because
media reports insinuate she was a bad mother or "mad" as a result of her
low I.Q. and her abduction and rape when she was 13.
16. TINA CORNELIUS - PURPOSEFUL KILLING
Tina Cornelius pled guilty and received two sixty-year sentences for
the 1999 killings of her 2-year-old son, Dominick, and her 3-year-old
daughter, Amanda.487 Tina's children were discovered lying in a creek bed
in late April 1999 and were identified by day care workers.488
Although police thought Tina might have been killed as well, she was
found days later in Corpus Christi.489 There, she had met a man at a
carnival and told him that she did not know whether her children were alive
479. Asin, supra note 476.
480. Liebrum, surpra note 475.
481. Asin, supra note 476.
482. John Makeig, Court Hears Details of Three Boys' Slayings, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 26,
1995, at 13A, available at 1995 WL 9405727.
483. Id.
484. Asin, supra note 476.
485. Id.
486. Bardwell, supra note 478.
487. David Hafetz, Mother Admits Killing Children, Tina Marie Cornelius Pleads Guilty
to Injury to a Child, Avoiding a Possible Death Sentence, AUSTIN AMER.- STATESMEN, Feb.
9, 2000, at Al, available at 2000 WL 7328962.
488. Indictment for Mom in Tots' Deaths, Prosecution May Go for the Death Penalty,
Hous. CHRON., June 30, 1999, at 24A, available at 1999 WL 3998461.
489. Mom Dropped Kids Off Cliff Police Say, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 13, 2000, at 31A,
available at 2000 WL 4274765.
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WT
because her boyfriend had taken them.490 However, a man in Austin said
that when he met her shortly after the deaths "she told him that her children
had died after falling off a cliff while with one of the children's fathers.
'
-9
Once apprehended, she told varying stories to police, but eventually said
that her life had spun out of control and that she had killed her children in
492desperation. She said she was emotionally drained and tired of
struggling to make money.493 Tina herself was 23 at the time she dropped
her children off a cliff, and she had been married twice.494 About a year
and a half before, she had moved from Arizona to get away from her
children's two fathers, who offered no support, and she lived in Austin with
her mother and sister.495 She worked at various jobs, including waiting
tables and topless dancing, and she attended auto mechanic classes.4 96 She
began abusing drugs and alcohol, and on the afternoon she killed the
children she felt "lost" when she picked them up from day care.497 When
the two children were "misbehaving" in the car she ended up dropping
them in the creek.498
Tina claimed, "I started feeling I had no right to be a mom when I can't
even take care of my own life. 499 She described driving to the cliff, where
she told her daughter she loved her, and dropped her off.500 She said she
realized then that she had made a mistake, but she picked her son up and
dropped him, too. 50' Although there is no judicial decision since Tina pled
guilty, media accounts indicate that the prosecutor's office and the media
labeled her a "bad mother." The prosecutor explicitly stated, "She is an
evil person who needs to be locked up, and what she did was truly
unspeakable. ,,502 Thus, Tina was specularized as a bad mother, a topless
dancer, selfish and "out of control. 50 3
17. NIRMALA KATTA - PURPOSEFUL KILLING
In late March 1996, Nirmala Katta, who was 28, shot and killed her
husband Ashok and their three children before setting their house on fire
and killing herself.504 The children were 6 (Anil), 4 (Jonathan) and 3
490. Christian Davenport, Grand Jury to Hear Evidence Against Dead Children's Mom,
AUSTIN. AMER.-STATESMEN, May 18, 1999, at B 1, available at 1999 WL 7412897.
491. Id.
492. Hafetz, supra note 487.
493. Id.
494. Id.
495. Id.
496. Davenport, supra note 490.
497. Hafetz, supra note 487.
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. Id.
501. Id.
502. Id. (emphasis added).
503. Hafetz, supra note 487.
504. Woman Who Killed Family, Self Bought Gun Days Earlier, DALLAS MORN. NEWS,
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(Jessica) - all died of gunshot wounds except Jessica, who suffocated. 5°5
The family lived in a suburb of Houston, and neighbors described the
family as happy and friendly; they often saw Ashok playing in the yard
506
with his children. One neighbor described the deaths as "unthinkable"
and neighbors initially assumed there had been a burglary. °7
News articles, especially one lengthy feature article, provide a great
deal of insight into Nirmala's life. She immigrated to the United States
from India in 1990 after an arranged marriage with her husband Ashok.' °8
Nirmala hoped she would find a better life in America, but what she found
was an abusive and cheating husband.50 9 Ashok had already been scheduled
for arraignment on wife-beating charges when the murders occurred." °
Her relatives conceded that her husband beat her regularly and she often
had bruises.51 1 They also acknowledged that Nirmala told them more than
once that she considered killing her family. 512 Nirmala's husband had a
long history of affairs and was already married to an American woman
(Deborah) and had a child when he married Nirmala. 513 Although he and
Deborah divorced before he went to India to marry Nirmala, when he
returned to America he lived with Deborah until Nirmala arrived.51 4 Ashok
continued to see Deborah and their daughter even after Nirmala arrived
with their son.51 5 Neither woman knew about the other child; nor did they
know he had been married before he married Deborah.51 6 Over time, he
had a series of girlfriends, and had a child with one.51 7  Ashok's last
girlfriend, a 19-year-old, encouraged him in letters to leave his wife and get
an apartment. 518 And, indeed, a key to a new apartment and a new lease
were discovered in the house after the murders. 1 9
Nirmala came from a traditional Indian family and culture that rejected
Mar. 27, 1996, at 18A, available at 1996 WL 2111216.
505. Patti Muck, 5 Found Slain in Torched House, Stafford Police Say Mother Had
Threatened Lives of Family, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 23, 1996, at IA, available at 1996 WL
5588616.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. Mike Tolson, WHEN HOPE DIES. They Appeared To Be the Model Immigrant
Family. She Was a Typical Devoted Mother. But Beneath Nirmala Katta's Smiles Lay
Tears of Pain. One Day in March She Put an End to It., Hous. CHRON., Jul. 7, 1996, at 1A,
available at 1996 WL 5608031.
509. Muck, supra note 505.
510. Id.
511. Tolson, supra note 508.
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. Id. Both Deborah and Nirmala got pregnant and had children a month apart.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. Id.
518. Id.
519. Id.
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520
divorce and shunned those who could not make their marriages work.
Because of this, she adamantly refused divorce, although she considered
moving back to India at times. 52' However, her parents did not want her to
move home even though she wrote letters to her parents telling them that
Ashok beat her and the children, that he locked the children in their rooms,
and that she was "ready to die" and had bought a gun to kill her entire
family. 522  The facts indicate that Nirmala weighed her choice for a
considerable period of time. She returned one gun and then tried to buy
another gun two months before the murders, but never returned to pick up
the selected pistol after the mandatory seven-day waiting period.523 Shortly
before the murders she made a successful attempt to buy a gun, spoke with
an attorney to try to drop the charges against Ashok, and wrote a note
indicating that she wanted the contents of her safe deposit box sent to her
family in India.524
Her story illustrates a typical characteristic of the "purposeful killing"
category not seen in many other Texas cases: she was an immigrant with
dire cultural problems.525 Although one news article provides a cultural
context for the tragic killings and suicide,526 the detectives' initial reactions
specularized Nirmala. As one detective said, "How could she do it? It's
unthinkable for a woman to do that, to kill her offspring and then light them
on fire. But of course we don't know the whole story. 527  Another
investigator said, "She may have shot him because of anger. As far as the
children, some people do these things because they don't want to leave
them behind. It's hard to say. It's hard to get in somebody's mind.,
528
Even Ashok's brother considered Nirmala crazy.529 The one lengthy news
article provides more of Nirmala's story through letters she wrote to her
father as well as evidence of Ashok's many affairs, abuse, and threats to
leave her.530 Additionally, it provides the cultural context for Nimala's
act-she was isolated without any close friends and was away from her
family. She did not have the option of divorcing Ashok, as that would have
ruined her family's name, and would have humiliated her parents and left
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. Id.
524. Id.
525. MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 151, at 90. It also shares other characteristic patterns
such as suicide, multiple deaths and failed relationship. Id. at 86-88. Juana Leija was also
an immigrant. See Ruiz, supra note 370.
526. Tolson, supra note 508.
527. Id.
528. Autopsies Confirm Woman Shot Family Stafford Police Study Apparent Murder-
Suicide-Arson, DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Mar. 25, 1996, at 22A, available at 1996 WL
2110906.
529. Tolson, supra note 508.
530. Id.
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her an outcast.531 One Indian view of marriage is "that the first decade of
marriage is the worst., 532  Nirmala was trapped, and, as the reporter
concludes, "turning on her children was her final act of maternal
responsibility. She would not allow them to grow up stained by
scandal.533 Thus, although the voice of Nirmala - i.e., her telling of the
story - is not heard directly, the one lengthy feature article which
contextualizes her story provides a rare example of recounting infanticide
without specularizing and labeling the mother as mad or bad. And like the
community responding to Sethe's act, we cannot condone Nirmala's act.
Perhaps we can view it, however, with "other love" as a "final act of
maternal responsibility.
534
V. A CONTEMPORARY TALE: HOUSTON MOTHER
DROWNS HER FIVE CHILDREN
Both the media and the legal process continue to construct motherhood
and stories of infanticide without listening to mothers' stories. This is true
in the recent case of Andrea Yates, convicted in March 2002 of two capital
murder charges and given a life term with no parole. Although her case is
currently on appeal, no briefs have yet been filed, so this analysis of
Andrea's story relies primarily on news accounts of her trial, letters to the
editor, and other publications.
According to Andrea's chilling confession, on June 20, 2001, she was
36 years old, had been married to Russell ("Rusty") Yates for eight years,
and had five children - from the ages of 7 years old to 6 months old.
5 35
After she fed the children breakfast, she filled the bathtub with water and
drowned each child.536 She laid them in bed, put their heads on a pillow,
and tucked a blanket around them.537 She put the baby's head on one of her
brother's shoulders. 538 She left only the last one she drowned - the one
who was the oldest and presumably the heaviest to carry - floating in the
bathtub. 539 Then she called 911 (saying only that she needed a police
officer), and called Rusty at work (NASA) and told him "It's time" and to
come home.14 She considered drowning the children an act of mercy, she
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. Id.
535. Transcript ofAndrea Yates' Police Interview, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 22, 2002, at 34A,
available at 2002 WL 3243514.
536. Id.
537. Timothy Roche, The Yates Odyssey, TIME, Jan. 28, 2002, 42, 50, available at 2002
WL 8385623.
538. Id.
539. Id.
540. Id. at 42.
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told the psychiatrist in jail.54' She said, "After I kill them, they would go
up to heaven and be with God and be safe. 542
Andrea suffered from postpartum psychosis. After the birth of her first
543
son in 1994, she had a hallucination that Satan told her to stab someone.
Several years later, living in a 350-square-foot bus with four young boys,
Andrea became depressed and hysterical and attempted suicide by
overdosing on antidepressant medicine.544  During another episode of
depression, she tried to slit her own throat with a kitchen knife. 545 Around
this time she was again having hallucinations, but this time they were more
546bloody. Andrea made some recovery when she was given the
antipsychotic drug, Haldol. In November of 2000 she had a fifth child, and
after that she was hospitalized for depression twice before she drowned the
children.547
Instructed on Texas law, the jury determined that Andrea had not been
legally insane at the time of the killings, because, even if she was suffering
548from postpartum psychosis, she still knew right from wrong. During
opening statements, the prosecutor admitted that Andrea was mentally ill
when she drowned the children,549 and during her trial, doctors reached
inconsistent conclusions regarding whether she was psychotic. Dr. Saeed,
who had treated her and discharged her before the drownings, testified that
he didn't believe she was psychotic before June 20.550 However, a doctor
541. Id. at 50.
542. Lisa Teachey, DA Releases Video of Yates Talking About Drownings, HOUS. CHRON.,
June 15, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL 3270713.
543. Roche, supra note 537 at 42, 45.
544. Id. at 46.
545. Id. at 47.
546. Id. at 47-48.
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Lashes Out, Medical Community, Legal System Come Under Fire, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 16,
2002, at TA, available at 2002 WL 3249590.
548. Analyzing the limitations of the insanity defense is outside the scope of this article,
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Prong, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 383 (2003); Sheri L. Bienstock, Mothers Who Kill Their
Children and Postpartum Psychosis, 32 Sw. U.L. REV. 451 (2003); Michele Connell, Note,
The Post Partum Psychosis Defense and Feminism: More or Less Justice for Women? 53
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 143 (2002); Connie Huang, It's a Hormonal Thing: Premenstrual
Syndrome and Postpartum Psychosis as Criminal Defenses, 11 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 345 (2002). Studies have demonstrated that "citizens are highly suspicious of
insanity claims [in infanticide trials] and the percentage of actual acquittals on grounds of
'not guilty by reason of insanity' (NGRI) is low. Moreover, even with an NGRI verdict, a
lengthy incarceration typically follows." Norman J. Finkel et al. "Commonsense Judgments
of Infanticide Murder, Manslaughter, Madness, or Miscellaneous?" 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
AND L. 1113, 1120 (2000).
549. Carol Christian, YATES TRIAL, Opening Rounds are Fired, Discovery of Children's
Bodies Described, HoUs. CHRON., Feb. 19, 2002, at IA, available at 2002 WL 3242649.
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called by the defense, Dr. George Ringholz, testified that she was psychotic
551
and schizophrenic, and that she did not know her actions were wrong.
Likewise, Dr. Melissa Ferguson (who evaluated her in jail) and her former
psychiatrist, Dr. Starbranch, both testified that she has "depression with
psychotic features" with possible schizophrenia.
552
On the other hand, the state's expert witness, Dr. Park Dietz, rebutted
the insanity defense by testifying that "he believed 'with reasonable
medical certainty' that she knew her actions at the time of drowning each
child were wrong in the eyes of the law, of society, and of God., 553 Dr.
Dietz testified that although Andrea told him "that she drowned the
children to save them from burning in hell ... [he] said some of her actions
were inconsistent with that belief ... [that] Yates did not do things that...
he would have expected a loving mother to do if she believed she was
saving her children from hell. 'She doesn't tell them they'll be with Jesus
or God,' he said. 'She doesn't offer words of comfort.' 554 Dr. Dietz's
testimony specularizes Andrea because his professional opinion is based on
his view of "what a loving mother" would have done.
After rejecting her insanity defense, four jurors who were interviewed
commented that Andrea's "confession proved.., that [she] was 'thinking
pretty clearly' and that she 'didn't sound psychotic.' ' 555 A third juror said
that Andrea "went to bed the night before, and she decided that's what she
was going to do the next day., 556 Another said that Andrea's call to 911
right after the murders showed "'she knew exactly what she was doing...
[a]nd she knew it was wrong, or she would not have called the police.'"51
Because of all the media attention, we know much more about
Andrea's life and marriage than we do about almost any other Texas
mother who has killed her children. But even with a plethora of
information, the discourse surrounding a mother who has killed her
children may objectify her - by silencing her, by specularizing her, and by
labeling her as mad. The following discussion illustrates that this occurred
2002 WL 3246594.
551. Carol Christian, Doctor: Yates Illness Severe, Did Not Know Actions Wrong, Hous.
CHRON., Feb. 27, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL 3244852.
552. Id.
553. Carol Christian, Yates Knew Drownings Were Wrong, Expert Says, Hous. CHRON.,
Mar. 9, 2002, at 1A, available at 2002 WL 3247887. At trial, Dr. Dietz, who advises the
producers of the television show Law and Order, stated that "shortly before Yates killed her
children, Law and Order had aired an episode in which a mother drowned her children and
was acquitted by reason of insanity"; however, after the jury found Yates guilty, Dietz
apologized because he learned that the show "had not written, produced or aired such a
show." See Casey, supra note 248. The grand jury reopened the case to investigate Dietz's
mistake but declined to indict him. See Rick Casey, Yates Shrink Nuts Over Show, Hous.
CHRON., Sept. 21, 2003, at 35A, available at 2003 WL 57444469.
554. Id.
555. Teachey, supra note 547.
556. Id.
557. Id.
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with regard to Andrea Yates.
A. SILENCING.
Andrea's husband, Rusty often spoke for her. A Time magazine article
described him as "[a] well-intentioned husband, strong-willed yet seen as
lacking empathy, who had the task of explaining his wife's mental
condition to physicians as she lapsed into silence and catatonia." 558 For
instance, during her hospitalization for attempted suicide in 1999, she told
her psychiatrist very little, but Rusty told the social worker that "Andrea
had 'lost her identity.' She relied on him for decisions" and that "Andrea
had 'some guilt about showing anger. ' 559  Likewise, when she was
hospitalized in 2001, Rusty "did all the talking.,
560
Was this because she was very private, as her high school friend
said?561  She never told Rusty about her several postpartum visions
involving bloody knives.562 After her arrest, Rusty told Time reporters "I
know a few things about her.., but I don't know a lot. I don't probe. I
don't want to be nosy., 563 When her psychiatrist, Dr. Starbranch, treated
her with Haldol after the birth of their fourth child, Rusty later said,
"Within a day, Andrea ... went from being completely catatonic to sitting
on the couch with me in the visiting area. And we carried on just - what I
refer to it as the best conversation we've ever had., 564 She "later. . . told
him that the Haldol injection was a 'truth serum' - and that she hated how
it caused her to lose control of herself",
565
Rusty has been criticized by the media and by various healthcare
workers as being too controlling. 66 Andrea's friend from her nursing days,
Debbie Holmes, said "through the years, she heard Andrea describe her
husband as controlling and manipulative., 567 Holmes testified at trial that
she tried to talk to Andrea about having more children because Andrea
seemed stressed, and when she asked Andrea whether Rusty was helping,
Andrea stated, "You know how Rusty is." ' 568 Moreover, another family in
group therapy at Deverouz with Andrea, described Rusty as "dominat[ing]
558. Roche, supra note 537, at 44.
559. Id. at 47.
560. Id. at 48.
561. Id. at 45.
562. Id. at 45-46.
563. Id. at 46.
564. 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 9, 2001), available at 2001 WL 8033831.
565. Roche, supra note 537, at 47.
566. Id. Many letters to the editor condemned Rusty for his part in the tragedy. See, e.g.,
Kathleen Parker, Finally the Monster Under the Bed Identified, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar.
24, 2002, at G3, available at 2002 WL 3037617. ("As to culpability, Russell Yates' leaving
his children with a demented, psychotic, suicidal woman is no different than leaving them
alone with a loaded gun.")
567. Roche, supra note 537, at 48.
568. Carol Christian, Witness Tracked Decline of Yates, Friend Testifies on Lack of Care,
Hous. CHRON., Mar. 1, 2002, at IA, available at 2002 WL 3246000.
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the discussions when others tried to talk, and... answer[ing] questions the
counselor asked his wife, who wouldn't nod her head., 569 Apparently, the
jury also saw Rusty as controlling and in their deliberations they "placed
some blame on [him]." 570 However, in jail, Andrea, who was delusional at
the time, told Dr. Ferguson that although "her children were doomed...
her husband, Russell Yates, [was] 'a righteous husband, a perfect
husband.'
571
We likely do not know the whole story of Andrea Yates, but what the
media and others describe as "controlling" very likely had the effect of
silencing her psyche and desires. When Rusty encouraged her to go back
to work part-time as a nurse, she replied that "[she was] a mother now.,
572
She had been the valedictorian of her high school class, and had worked as
a nurse for eight years before she married and had children. Of course, as
one of her psychiatrists pointed out, she was either pregnant or
breastfeeding most of the time after she married, so she had little
opportunity, practically speaking, to think about going back to nursing.
She had been a champion swimmer in high school and loved to sail.573
Even though she began swimming again, "doing a furious 70 laps at dawn
in the neighborhood pool" after her first bout of depression,574 she did not
really have time for herself because she was busy home-schooling children.
The family had Bible study at home three nights a week, one night each
week Rusty took one of the boys out for pizza, and one other night each
week, called "Mommy's Night Out," Andrea took one of the children with
her.575 While we might imagine how these circumstances influenced
Andrea's decision to drown her children, her perspectives and desires have
been silenced.
B. SPECULARIZING.
Andrea has been specularized as a "good" mother who lost her mind.
Even after her conviction, Rusty said he didn't blame her, and his aunt
commented that "The trial hasn't changed our opinion toward Andrea at
all," and the "family still believes Yates thought she was doing the right
thing for her children., 576 Rusty reiterated this specularization in a 60
569. Roche, supra note 537, at 48.
570. Lisa Teachey, Jurors Say The)' Believed Yates Knew Right from Wrong, Hous.
CHRON., Mar. 18, 2002, at IA, available at 2002 WL 3249957.
571. Carol Christian & Lisa Teachey, Yates Believed Children Doomed, Psychiatrist Says
Mom Delusional, Fixated on Satan, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 23, 2002, at IA, available at 2002
WL 3243867.
572. 60 Minutes, supra note 564.
573. Roche, supra note 537, at 45.
574. Roche, supra note 537, at 47.
575. Id. at 48.
576. Carol Christian & Lisa Teachey, Yates Found Guilty, Jury Takes 3 /2 Hours to
Convict Mother in Children's Deaths, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 13, 2002, at IA, available at
2002 WL 3248597.
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Minutes interview in which he insisted, "She's a terrific mother that loved
the children. They're always climbing up in her lap, and she'd read books
to them and all just all kinds of stuff, and she loved them., 577 He explained
that she home-schooled the children, made costumes for them to act out
medieval history, and cooked and cleaned the house. 578 Ed Bradley, the 60
Minutes correspondent, commented, while looking at family pictures, "it
looks like a normal, happy family., 579 The interview specularized Andrea
as a good mother and upright citizen when Rusty commented on how
ridiculous it was for her to have group therapy for substance abuse at the
last hospital she was in because "She never drinks. She never has smoked,
any drugs, nothing, never even tried it, you know. And... she's.., the
cleanest person in town."
580
The discourse surrounding Andrea's trial specularized her as a terrific
mother, the projection of the male ego.581 Rusty was so enamored of this
image that he ignored warning signs, such as her suicide attempts, and her
act of filling the bathtub with water one morning two months before she
drowned the children.582 Ironically perhaps, since Andrea's conviction
Rusty has become an expert in postpartum depression and psychosis, but he
did not listen when Andrea's doctor warned them against having any more
children. In the 60 Minutes interview, Rusty responded to this concern by
saying, "We looked at that [warning] and we said, you know, 'Well this
was a very difficult time,' but then we said, 'Well, would we rather have
not had Luke?' I mean, of course, we'd rather have Luke and have gone
through that. What we were told was that there was a 50 percent chance
that she would be depressed again if we had another child. And if she got
depressed again, she would have the same symptoms.., and that the same
treatment that worked for her ... would work again. 583 One cannot help
but wonder if Rusty's "we" reflects Andrea's desires, especially since when
she got pregnant, Rusty said he wanted another boy for a basketball
team. 584 Yet after the drownings, Andrea asked a psychiatrist why she
couldn't have sacrificed solely Mary: "I'm such a monster. . . I only had to
577. 60 Minutes, supra note 564.
578. Id. Rusty added that "When they studied horses, they read Black Beauty and went
riding real ones. When they were learning about Indians, she crafted a cardboard diorama
including pretend deerskin stretched across with twigs." Roche, supra note 537, at 48.
579. 60 Minutes, supra note 564.
580. Id.
581. For instance, columnist Ellen Goodman commented about the case that "The makings
of a mommy case were everywhere. Perfect love, protection, nurturance are 'natural.' The
failure to be the perfect mother to produce perfect children is proof of the devil." Madness
as Mother's Helper, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 6, 2002, at A9, available at 2002
WL 3799862.
582 60 Minutes, supra note 564. (Andrea had filled the bathtub in early May and "could not
explain why she did it," which motivated Rusty to take her back to her therapist).
583. 60 Minutes, supra note 564.
584. Roche, supra note 537, at 48.
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kill one. The baby would have been so easy. Rusty didn't want a girl; he
wanted another boy for a basketball team.
585
Rusty continued to project his gaze upon Andrea as the perfect mother
despite her psychotic self-identification as a bad mother. For instance, in
her confession she said that she had "been having these thoughts about
hurting [her] children for up to two years" and that she "realized that it was
time to be punished ... [for not being a good mother., 586 She also said in
her confession that she "realized [she] ha[d] not been a good mother to
them" because "[t]hey weren't developing correctly" but were having
"[b]ehavior" and "[l]earning problems. 587 Later she told doctors in jail
that
she was a lousy mother. The death of her children, she said, was
her punishment, not theirs. It was, she explained, a mother's final
act of mercy ... [and that] [o]nly her execution would rescue her
from the evil inside her... from the clutches of Satan .... She
told the doctors she wanted her hair shaved so she could see the
number 666 - the mark of the Antichrist - on her scalp. She also
wanted her hair cropped in the shape of a crown, perhaps the kind
the Bible says Jesus will give to those who have won salvation.588
Andrea saw herself as a "bad" mother.589 Her husband, family, and the
media specularized her as an ideal mother and failed to elicit her story with
"other love." Her own account is partial and reductive. None of these
constructions fairly represented Andrea's own subjectivity.
C. "MAD OR BAD."
A third problem is that discourse about infanticides labels mothers who
kill as mad or bad. In commenting about why the infanticides of Andrea
Yates and Susan Smith received so much attention, Cheryl Meyer, a
specialist in postpartum depression and psychosis, stated:
The one thing the women who made national news did have in
common was that they seemed unlikely candidates to kill their
children. They did not fit the stereotype of a woman who would
kill her child. What is that unspoken stereotype? A woman who is
585. Carol Christian, Witness: Yates Kids Unconscious but Alive after Being Pulled from
Tub, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 9, 2002, at
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts./special/drownings/12998482.
586. Transcript ofAndrea Yates'Police Interview, supra note 535.
587. Id.
588. Roche, supra note 537, at 50.
589. MEYER AND OBERMAN, supra note 151, at 89 (pointing out that in the category of
purposeful killing, "one of the most distinctive features of these women's stories was their
devotion toward their children. While it may seem like an oxymoron to describe women
who kill their children as loving mothers, by all accounts that is exactly what most of them
were.").
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"mad" or insane, a woman who is "bad" or evil, a woman who is
economically underprivileged or a woman of color. Andrea Yates
in Texas confuses us and captures our attention. We don't ask why
she did it when a woman who fits our stereotype commits the
crime of infanticide; we only ask why when white middle-class
mothers kill their children.5 90
Although, as discussed above, examples of white middle-class mothers
killing their children are not as rare as we would like to believe, 59'
nevertheless, the mother who kills her child is reductively defined as
"deficient, dangerous, and evil" and "whose neglectful, abusive, reckless,
or even murderous behaviors threaten or destroy her children. ' '592 Her
subjectivity is difficult to unearth.
This stereotyping characterized the discourse about Andrea. She was
specularized as a "good" mother, but her trial and news stories objectified
her as both "mad" and "bad." The seeming inconsistency between being a
"good mother" and yet "mad" can be explained by her mental illness.
Meyer points out that the one percent of mothers who suffer from
postpartum psychosis are often described as "devoted mothers [who] cared
for their children, loved to be with their children. 593  Many of these
women become obsessed with being "good mothers" because they
"become very insecure about who they are and their parenting ability," and
when their obsession shifts to a delusion it sometimes becomes "even more
severe ... slipping over into psychosis. 594
While they may be specularized as ideal mothers, many, like Andrea
Yates, talk about the "child being inadequate or tainted somehow by their
bad mothering."595  Indeed, after Andrea was hospitalized and Rusty
bought a house in Clear Lake, Andrea told him that "she felt she had
'failed' at the simple life in the bus."596 However, on the 60 Minutes
segment, Rusty said that she didn't want to go back to her nursing career
because being a mother was "her fulfillment. That's where she got her
fulfillment... in teaching the children and raising the children."'5 97 At trial
he testified that "the family had a traditional division of labor. 'Man is the
breadwinner, and woman is the homemaker."'5 98 After the trial, Andrea's
590. Cheryl M. Meyer, Andrea Yates, The Mother Next Door, Women Who Kill Their
Children Often Give Warnings, Says Cheryl L. Meyer, But the Severity of Postpartum
Depression Is Too Often Discounted, PITrSBURG POST-GAZETrE, July 1, 2001 (Editorial),
available at 2001 WL 2206275.
591. See supra, text accompanying note
592. See Ashe, supra note 14, at 1019-20.
593. 60 Minutes, supra note 564.
594. Id.
595. Id.
596. Roche, supra note 537, at 47.
597. 60 Minutes, supra note 564.
598. Christian, supra note 568.
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mother told reporters that "after the birth of their fourth child [Rusty told
her] that he had never changed a diaper."5 99 Thus, we don't really know
whether being a mother was her fulfillment or her duty - a duty to be a
good parent that shifted from an obsession into a psychosis.
Nevertheless, as indicated above, media and the judicial system labeled
her "mad," until the jury rejected her insanity defense, and then labeled her
"bad." For instance, after Andrea was convicted of capital murder and
given a life sentence, her next-door neighbor said, "They could not have
come back with anything else .... If they had, it would have been open
season on kids., 600 Likewise, Kaylynn Williford, one of the prosecutors
who tried Andrea, stated that "Mental illness is not a get-out-of-jail-free
card., 60 1  And when NOW defended Yates, columnist Mora Charen
criticized the organization as having "a moral screw loose ... isn't there
something repellent about expressing such sympathy for a woman who has
methodically drowned her five children?
' 60 2
The way a story is told often shapes our responses. If the mother is
given the opportunity to articulate her experiences, then listeners (families,
the public, law enforcement) will have a way to respond to the mother not
as the "mad or bad" other, but as a speaking subject.6°3 Listeners can
respond to stories of mothering with empathy. As difficult as it is to hear
accounts of infanticide, it is much more difficult to hear them as tales of
love. Even Yates's psychiatrist, Dr. Lucy Puryear, who interviewed
Andrea after the murders, stated "I spend a large part of my time trying to
prevent what happened .... As a mother of four, I find it almost
unimaginable to think about what happened." 604 To consider Andrea
Yates's murder of her five children as taking place out of love can
challenge constructions of motherhood and of infanticide. And more
practically, perhaps, as Marie Ashe argues, literature such as Beloved can
599. Carol Christian & Kristen Mack, Yates Faces the End Alone, No Family Present at
Her Sentencing, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 19, 2002, at IA, available at 2002 WL 3250225.
600. Ruth Rendon, "We Cannot Forget the Children, " Jury's Decision Fails to Surprise
Neighborhood, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 13, 2002, at 29A, available at 2002 WL 3248819.
601. Ann Hodges, Little New in Yates Story on "American Justice, " Hous. CHRON., Jan.
15, 2003, at 8, available at 2003 WL 3230411. Ken Anderson, District Attorney in
Williamson County, remarked that the Yates and Cornelius cases were "'different from
normal cases where a parent kills a child,"' because they involved "'an evil mindset beyond
what most people can imagine."' Mike Tolson, What Now for Andrea Yates? The Mother of
Five Drowned Children Is Accused of a Horrifying Crime, But Most Such Cases Haven't
Led to a Death Sentence, Hous. CHRON., July 1, 2001, at IA, available at 2001 WL
23611631.
602. Kohm and Liverman, supra note 180, at 64. See also, Sally Satel, The Newest
Feminine Icon-A Killer Mom, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2001, at A26, available at 2001 WL-
WSJ 2875243. ("Turning Ms. Yates into a feminist cause is the kind of gimmickry we have
come to expect from groups like NOW.")
603. See Tobin, at supra note 14.
604. Carol Christian, Yates' Mom Asks Jurors for Mercy, Sentencing Could Be Decided
Today, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 15, 2002, at 1A, available at 2002 WL 3249411.
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provide some assistance for lawyers struggling to represent "'bad mother'
clients. 6 °5
VI. CONCLUSION: IS LITERATURE A TOOL TO HELP US
RENDER JUSTICE?
In her Nobel Lecture, Morrison stated that "[language can never 'pin
down' slavery, genocide, war. Nor should it yearn for the arrogance to be
able to do so. Its force, its felicity is in its reach toward the ineffable. 60 6
In June 2001 when Andrea Yates drowned her children, I was pregnant
with my third child, and during her trial in February 2002, I was so
wrapped up with the care of an infant that I could not bear to read any news
reports about infanticide. I consciously refused to follow news accounts of
what I considered the ineffable - a mother's murder of her five children.
As a feminist lawyer, however, I am frustrated that Andrea Yates's
story has been suppressed, that the media and legal discourse have
constructed the tragedy with Andrea Yates as "other." Is it possible for
"attorneys and judges [to] explore the ambiguities of the maternal
experience as expressed from the mother's perspective? 607 Can literature
help attorneys and judges do this? 608  Even assuming that literature
provides a model to listen to a mother's story of infanticide with other love,
to hear the complexity of her experience, how does a novel like Beloved
help attorneys and judges render justice, especially in those instances in
which "the underlying realities of mothers' lives remain so private that
their nature is not readily suggested by references to race or class ... [or]
sometimes hidden wounds are not fully recognized as related to gender
605. Ashe, supra note 14, at 1022.
606. Tobin, supra note 14, at 270.
607. Tobin, supra note 14, at 237. In an article that argues that we should respond to
stories such as that of Andrea Yates with compassion rather than disgust, Elizabeth Bangs
cites letters to the editor that show compassion. For instance, one letter stated, "the more I
read about Andrea Yates, the more convinced I became that she is hardly more monstrous
than I am." Elizabeth Bangs, Disgust and the Drownings in Texas: The Law Must Tackle
Emotion When Women Kill Their Children, 12 UCLA L.J. 87, 105 (2001) (book review).
Bangs gives several examples such as these of what she calls "an ability not to see Andrea
Yates as an animalistic other, as disgusting." Id.
608. Many scholars resoundingly argue that literature provides a useful tool for informing
better legal analyses and decisionmaking. See, e.g., Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic,
Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error? 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929
(1991); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and
Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665 (1990) (arguing that "Narratives with evocative,
rich details about subjective experiences can be used to persuade people - like judges -
who have sufficient power to make a difference actually to do so for people-like children
and women - who face persistent risks of violence at the hands of intimate fellow
householders").
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either., 60 9 One answer is provided by Oberman, who argues:
This is not to say that those who commit infanticide are blameless,
but rather than, as seen against the backdrop of the construction of
motherhood, on some occasions this terrible crime may be all but
inevitable. The task, then, in a civilized and compassionate
society, is to determine how to deal justly with those will kill their
children, and more importantly, how to mobilize all of our
resources to prevent these needless deaths in the future.6 1°
While these proposed changes are indeed necessary, this article argues
that our construction of motherhood must be re-examined and that the
presumptions and foundations constructing motherhood must be challenged
and subverted in order to allow stories to be heard with compassion, with
other love.
What a novel such as Beloved offers is an invitation to rethink the
practicalities of the legal construction of motherhood. It offers one
alternative to the dominant forms of telling a story of infanticide. The
argument Marie Ashe and Naomi Cahn make regarding a "counter-
narrative" in child abuse cases applies as well to infanticide:
the image of "bad mother" . . . discloses the barest outlines of a
counter-narrative detailing the contextual realities of "bad
mothers." The fuller development of new narratives will require
the commitment of all story-tellers to persistent inquiry and to
persistent self-examination .... For example, social scientists,
judges, and lawyers should recognize that the realities of the lives
purportedly described or defined by social science always exceed
the legal categories into which they are forced .... Raising the
question "Who is speaking?" might similarly operate to expose the
class, racial, gender, and other biases that often enjoy free play in
the adjudication [of these matters].611
As lawyers and judges, we can strive to more fully develop this story,
both in the representation of mothers accused of infanticide and in the
words and facts selected to craft judicial decisions. Indeed, rather than
specularize, silence, and label mothers as "mad or bad," lawyers and judges
should make every effort to give recognition to the "other" and should try
both to represent and to judge mothers accused of infanticide with other
love.
609. Ashe, supra note 167, at 153.
610. Michelle Oberman, A Brief History of Infanticide and the Law, in INFANTICIDE:
PSYCHOSOCIAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON MOTHERS WHO KILL 3, 16 (Margaret G.
Spinelli ed., 2003).
611. Marie Ashe and Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2
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